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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the two post-Soviet decades Russia has become actively involved in international labour flows. 
Today Russia acts as an exporter and an importer of labour in the global labour market: Russian 
citizens work all over the world, from Europe to New Zealand; while labor migrants in the Russian 
Federation are predominantly citizens from the former Soviet republics. Russia annually attracts 
around 1.5 million labour migrants, three quarters of whom come from the CIS countries. In fact, the 
Russian labour market is a regional one, employing millions of citizens of the post-Soviet countries, a 
fact which, in the end, provides relative social stability in the region. 
The present executive summary will examine both sides of Russian participation in the global 
labour market. However, the main focus will be on labour migration to Russia, as the import of labour 
resources is larger and more significant for the country’s economic development.  
The role of migrants in the Russian economy is predetermined primarily by demographic factors. 
At present Russia has a declining and ageing population (especially in the working age groups). 
Moreover, Russian professional education does not correspond to labour market needs in terms either 
of qualifications or professional structure; this has resulted in a lack of skilled personnel in certain 
professions and occupations. A labour-intensive economy, inherited from the Soviet Union, is 
characterized by manual labour and contributes to the preservation of numerous low-qualified jobs 
that do not correspond to the labour requirements of the local population. In other words, there is a 
serious supply and demand imbalance in the national labour market. “Personnel hunger” is determined 
by an absolute and relative deficit of labour resources and the structural deformation of the labour 
market. In this context Russian economic development depends, to a large extent, on foreign workers.  
Over the last decade migrants have become firmly integrated into various sectors of the Russian 
economy; the labour market is clearly segmented. This process is, in great part, spontaneous, in two 
respects. First, up to 80% of migrants working in Russia do not enter into contracts with their 
employers, meaning that migrants are in the country illegally. Then, second, Russian state policy in 
the field of labour migration fails to offer clear and transparent employment schemes for foreign 
workers that would provide foreign labour for those economic sectors and regions where it is truly 
needed. The second point is particularly associated with the fact that labour migration to Russia is 
plagued by myths. There are persistent myths, for example, among the general population and among 
decision-makers that migrants take away jobs from Russians, reduce the general salary level, bring 
money out of Russia, slow down Russian modernization, criminalize Russian society etc. There are no 
well-reasoned studies refuting these stereotypes. Indeed, these myths, sustained in part by the state, 
become the cause of anti-migrant feelings, xenophobia and ethnic clashes. As a result labour migration 
turns from a critical source for Russian development into a “problem that needs to be resolved”. This 
approach prevents Russia’s migration policy from becoming systematic and consistent, deprives it of 
strategic perspective, and, most importantly, it detaches migration policy from state employment 
policy, education policy etc.  
Research objectives and tasks. The aim of the present research is to objectively evaluate the role 
of labour migration for the Russian economy, and the pros and cons of the existing model of migrant 
recruitment. Such an evaluation would make space for rational theories and decisions in the field of 
labour migration regulation. The following specific tasks were set: (i) analyze the demographic 
dynamic in Russia and forecast the size of employable population for the next 20 years; (ii) evaluate 
the composition of supply and demand in the Russian labour market and existing schemes to 
compensate for the deficit of labour resources; (iii) trace the dynamic of labour migration in Russia 
(1994-2011), as well as the sectoral composition of the foreign workforce and its geographic 
distribution across federal districts; (iv) consider the reasons and consequences of large-scale illegal 
migration and the unregistered employment of foreign citizens; (v) evaluate the efficiency of the last 
20 years of labour migration regulation; (vi) debunk the myths surrounding international labour 
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migration in Russia; (vii) underline migration’s role in the development of the country; and (viii) 
develop recommendations for migration policy improvement, including intergovernmental 
cooperation measures.  
The paper structure corresponds to the research tasks. The methodology sections, where the 
existing literature is analyzed, are followed by research hypotheses and the description of 
methodology and statistics. The authors carefully examine: (1) those objective demographic and 
economic factors that are important for international labour migration and characterize contemporary 
Russian development; (2) the specific features of labour migration to Russia, its sectoral and 
geographic composition and its impact upon regional labour markets; (3) illegal labour migration and 
its controversial role for the Russian economy; (4) the migration of Russian citizens overseas for 
employment and its role for Russian economic development; and (5) Russian migration policy with 
regards to international labour migration as it has been pursued in the last decade. The paper concludes 
with recommendations based on our analysis. The authors believe that these recommendations are 
fundamental for the further development of Russian migration policy and more specifically for 
unlocking labour migration potential with minimum costs.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Numerous papers by Russian and by foreign authors are devoted to how international migration to 
Russia has developed in the post-Soviet years; its impact on demographic dynamics and the economic 
development of the country and the evolution of Russian migration policy (see, for instance: Mukomel 
2006; Topilin and Parfentseva 2008; Aleshkovsky 2011; Iontsev 1999, 2005; Zayonchkovskaya and 
Tyuryukanova 2010; Tyuryukanova 2011; Ivakhnyuk 2005, 2011; Metelev 2006; Ryazantsev 2007; 
Ryazantsev and Horie 2011 etc.). Some of these papers are overviews; others focus on specific aspects 
of international migration or on the role of migration policy in migration flows. It seems that there is 
consensus that for contemporary Russia international migration has a role it has never had before. 
This conclusion relies on the demographic crisis Russia is experiencing at the moment, rather than on 
the liberalized regime of departure and entry that opened up Russia to the rest of the world and made it 
part of global migration flows. This demographic crisis demands that migration, at least partially, 
compensates for the population decline and that it alleviates associated problems in the labour market.  
Research interest in labour migration in Russia began around 2000, when it became evident that the 
ethnically-determined, mostly forced migration, typical of the early post-Soviet phase, was being 
replaced by economic and primarily labour migration. Researchers were above all drawn to those 
forms and manifestations of labour migration that presented the most acute problems for Russia, 
namely illegal migration, brain drain, and “shuttle migration”.  
Here one should note that the Russian state agencies regulating migration processes – primarily the 
Federal Migration Service and the Federal Service of Labour and Employment – do not show much 
interest in international labour migration or in obtaining objective expert assessment; though this 
might constitute a credible scientific foundation for decision-making. The universities and research 
institutions of the Russian Academy of Sciences have little funding for independent research projects: 
state requests for research are minimal. Hence international organizations and foreign foundations 
have led the way in migration research in the last two decades. This fact predetermined the research 
topics. The authors primarily analyze migration trends in Russia and other CIS states that have (or that 
might have) a direct or indirect impact on other countries, above all European Union member-states.  
This is why, for instance, illegal migration in Russia became a priority in the early 2000s (see, for 
instance, Illegal migration… 2004). And by the late 2000s it was the impact of the global economic 
crisis on the migration situation in Russia and in the post-Soviet region as a whole that proved of 
special interest (IОМ 2009). Now, in the early 2010s, the feminization of migration flows, including 
flows of unregistered labour migrants, has become an independent area of research (UNIFEM-IOM 
2009; Tyuryukanova 2011). Specific requests coming from international organizations are behind most 
of these studies.  
Role of International Labour Migration in Russian Economic Development 
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Another limiting factor in the research of international labour migration is a scarcity of statistical 
data. This is particularly the case with regards to registered migration and, it should be remembered 
that a considerable part of migration flows remains outside the scope of statistics (for a detailed 
description see section “Methodology and Data”). Scholars have to rely on the limited amount of 
aggregated data, often insufficient for in depth research. Thus, in Russia there are practically no 
studies of labour migration from Russia (some fragments of such studies can only be found in 
Ryazanysev 2007; Ivakhnyuk 2005; Topilin and Parfentseva 2008). Available statistical data are based 
solely on information collected by companies that have licenses to offer job placement services for 
Russian citizens abroad. But this amounts to only a small fraction of labour migration flow directed 
from Russia, as many migrants find jobs overseas via other channels or through their own exertions. 
When these studies took place, they largely focused on the employment of Russian labour migrants in 
destination countries (Ryazantsev 2007). They did not typically look at the consequences of this 
outflow of labour resources for the Russian economy.  
Sociological surveys are a crucial source of information on international labour migration, 
especially in the context of dominant unregistered migration. But until recently these have been 
fragmented and were unrepresentative in terms of the sample, which limits their applicability in any 
analysis of national trends. A worthy exception was a research project that was led by Elena 
Tyuryukanova and carried out in 2008-2009 by the Center for Migration Studies, the Institute for 
Economic Forecasting and the Russian Academy of Sciences. The project comprised a survey of 1,575 
foreign workers from CIS countries in six regions of European Russia1, focus groups with those who 
employ migrant labour, and expert interviews. This provided the project team with abundant material 
for scientific conclusions about: the characteristics of contemporary labour migration in Russia; the 
types of migrant employment; the models of migrant behavior in the Russian labour market; their level 
of income and expenses; as well as the practices of Russian employers using foreign workers 
(Tyuryukova 2011).  
Another interesting attempt to develop a model of the Russian “regional labour market with 
extensive use of labour migrants from Central Asian countries” (based on the Moscow Region) was 
made in Ryazantsev and Horie 2011. This study was founded on quantitative and qualitative 
sociological studies carried out by authors in migrant environment. This paper continues the serious 
study of labour migration in the CIS and Baltic countries published by Sergey Ryazantsev in 2007 
(Ryazantsev 2007). It shifts the research focus though to post-Soviet states in Central Asia, key 
migration donors for Russia.  
However, these two studies do not identify such issues of fundamental importance as the impact of 
labour migrants in Russia on general trends such as unemployment, productivity, salary and social 
security. Attempts to analyze the Russian labour market in its interrelation with labour markets and the 
labour potential of other CIS countries were made by Anatoly Topilin. The author brings up a question 
about whether the emergence of a single labour market can bring sustainable development to the 
countries of the region (Topilin 2004). The key merit of Topilin’s work is the shift of focus to the 
regional level in the analysis of the role of labour migration for labour market development. This is 
strengthened by the author’s classification of Russian regions in terms of the importance of migration 
for regional labour markets (Topilin and Parfentseva 2008). 
Obviously, the demand for foreign workers on the part of small, medium and large businesses is 
different. So is the scale, professional qualification and educational composition of foreign workers, 
attracted by these three sectors, as well as the geographical preferences of employers in terms of 
migrants’ countries of origin. The first and, to date, the only attempt to assess the impact of labour 
migration on the development of small and medium businesses in Russia was made in a study 
launched by the Russian Organization of Small and Medium Business “Opora Rossii” (Lunkin et al. 
                                                     
1 (1) Moscow and the Moscow Region, (2) the Saint Petersburg and Leningrad Region, (3) the Voronezh Region, (4) the 
Astrakhan Region, (5) the Krasnodar Region and (6) the Tatarstan Republic. 
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2010). The study relied on the large-scale survey of Russian employers carried out for this purpose by 
the Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTSIOM) and this study covered 1500 
enterprises in 47 Russian regions. The Lunkin et al. study is unique, in obtaining an objective image of 
the role of international labour migration in the development of entrepreneurship in Russia from 
insiders, and particularly from entrepreneurs. 
The authors of the present study also contributed to an analysis of the role of migration on Russian 
development (Iontsev 1999, 2005; Ivakhnyuk 2005, 2008, 2011 etc.). They represent the Department 
of Population, at the Faculty of Economics of Lomonosov Moscow State University. In the course of 
the last 50 years this department has taken a complex approach in demographic and migration studies. 
It was here that the idea of “migratiology” as an independent scientific discipline was conceived. In 
1998 the department began to publish a scientific series “International Migration of Population: Russia 
and the Contemporary World”, that serves as a theoretical platform for the exchange of scholarly ideas 
on international migration, from Russia and abroad. The empirical and theoretical studies of migration 
carried out in Russia and other countries are published in the pages of this series. The department also 
holds scientific conferences, to find answers to the most pressing questions associated with migration 
and development in Russia and the post-Soviet region as a whole; these conferences also see the 
formulation of conceptual approaches to migration-policy formation.  
Yet, notwithstanding this work, it can be argued that there has still not been any systematic, 
complex studies of international labour migration that would give a comprehensive answer to the 
question of its role in the economic development of Russia. Obviously the main obstacle here is the 
lack of relevant empirical information about migration flows, as well as a lack of information on the 
detailed characteristics of the Russian labour market.  
In the meantime, an impartial assessment of the role of international labour migration in Russian 
economic development is absent. It is then possible for myths – many of them negative and politicized 
– to develop in the vacuum. These myths provoke anti-migrant feelings in Russian society, thus 
creating an extremely unfavorable context for migration policy formulation.  
3. OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
This project aims to evaluate the role of international labour migration in Russian economic 
development now and over the mid-term. To do so it will employ available statistical data and 
generalized sociological research. The focus of the paper is on labour migration directed into Russia, 
in as much as the inflow of labour migrants exceeds the outflow of labour migrants from Russia and 
this inflow is very important for the Russian economy.  
4. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The terms associated with international migration, which are used in the present paper, correspond to 
the Russian migration-related scientific literature. Russian authors mostly give the same sense to these 
terms as scholars from elsewhere. However, the sense can sometimes differ from the definitions 
accepted in other countries. Therefore, we offer here, for the sake of clarity, a series of definitions.  
International migration: the movement of people over state borders related to a change of 
residence, permanently or temporarily. 
International labour migration: temporary (return) migration aimed at employment in a different 
country: long-term, short-term or seasonal. A special form of international labour migration is illegal 
migration, mostly motivated by the desire to find work.  
International labour migrants: persons, temporarily and voluntarily leaving their own country to 
seek employment in another country. This notion does not include those who took up permanent 
Role of International Labour Migration in Russian Economic Development 
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residence (immigrants) in the country and who then found employment in the national labour market 
as citizens of the destination country.  
Illegal labour migration: the legal or illegal entry of citizens from one country into another country 
for reasons of illegal employment. The employment of foreign citizens in violation of migration and 
labour legislation turns them into illegal migrants.  
Immigration: the entry of foreign citizens into the country for permanent residence and, as a rule, 
for new citizenship. 
Foreign workforce: foreign citizens, who enter another country for legal employment over the 
course of several years with a mandatory return to the country of permanent residence. 
Marginal employment: employment in economic sectors, weakly covered by social and labour 
standards, implying a high level of professional risk. 
Migration infrastructure: a complex of state and non-state institutions, ensuring legitimacy, 
awareness and the safety of migrants at different stages of migration (information and consultation 
centers, employment services, legal services etc.) 
Brain drain: losses incurred by the state due to the departure of highly-skilled professionals for 
permanent (as a rule, accompanied by the change of citizenship) or temporary residence with labour 
contracts.  
This paper relies on empirical data and statistical information provided by the Russian Federal 
Service of State Statistics (Rosstat), the Russian Federal Service for Labour and Employment 
(Rostrud) and the Russian Federal Migration Service (FMS), as well as summaries of the few 
sociological studies carried out in Russia in recent years. Forecasts of the size and composition of the 
Russian population until 2025 made by Rosstat will be used to analyze the country’s demographics. 
It is noteworthy that the existing statistics for international labour migration to Russia do not 
adequately reflect the scale of this phenomenon. According to estimates accepted by researchers, 
practitioners and politicians, 70-80% of labour migrants in Russia reside and work in Russia illegally, 
i.e. they do not get registered and they do not enter into official contracts with employers. This means 
that labour migration statistics based on the number of work permits issued every year does not fully 
reflect the real inflow of foreign citizens coming to Russia to work. After all, there are many illegal 
migrants who are not captured in this data. Furthermore, there is an evident flaw in work permit 
statistics. Over the course of a year the same person can obtain several work permits, hence the legal 
labour migrants in Russia are, according to experts, overestimated by 30-40% (Chudinovskikh 2010).  
The situation is even worse in the case of statistics dealing with labour migration from Russia. 
Official statistics rely only on information collected by companies that have licenses to offer 
employment services for Russian citizens abroad. These statistics thus include only those Russian 
citizens who found employment in other countries relying on the assistance of such intermediaries. 
Those who found jobs overseas through their own efforts remain outside the scope of statistical 
reports. Besides, official statistics do not cover activities of oil, metallurgical, nuclear and other 
industrial companies that build facilities abroad both on commercial terms and within bilateral 
intergovernmental agreements. These companies offer jobs to Russians, even though they do not have 
licenses for external economic activities. Finally, illegal labour migrants who enter on a tourist visa 
and who then violate the terms of stay by working illegally also remain unaccounted for.  
These flaws in statistical data on international labour migration into/out of Russia are taken into 
consideration in the present study and they are specifically dealt with in the relevant sections. 
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5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The role of international labour migration in Russian economic development is defined by a number of 
objective demographic and economic factors and the situation in the national labour market, as well as 
Russian migration policies.  
5.1. Demographic context 
Existing trends in Russian demographic development are characterized by declining population. The 
number of deaths exceeds the number of births, which results in an annual natural decline in 
population, ageing the population causing a decline in employable-age population. Russia has never 
faced such a large-scale population decline in peace-time.  
From 1992 to 2011 the natural decline in the Russian population was over 13 million. A positive 
migration balance somewhat alleviated this process, otherwise the Russian population would have 
been fewer than 130 million instead of the present 142.8 million.  
Fig. 1 demonstrates that natural decline slowed down in the second half of the 2000s. In 2011 it 
was –131,000 people compared to –241,000 in 2010, primarily due to an increase in the number of 
births. However, in the coming years the number of births will inevitably go down again as a result of 
the “demographic wave”: a generation born in the 1990s, whose numbers are relatively small, will 
enter their reproductive years. 
Fig. 1.Natural decline and migration growth of the Russian population,  
1993-2010, thousand people 
 
Source: based on Rosstat data 
Demographic dynamics gave Russia a unique chance. Before 2007 the employable-age population 
had been increasing against the background of overall population decline. From 1995 to 2006 the 
employable population increased by more than six million. The so-called “demographic window” 
opened. This was a favorable situation in economic terms, when the demographic weight of children 
and the elderly on those in employment is relatively low. This creates a “window of opportunity”. 
Role of International Labour Migration in Russian Economic Development 
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Instead, Russia failed to use this “window” to accelerate its economic growth2, unlike China, for 
instance, that made the most of its “demographic dividend” in the 2000s. After the “demographic 
window” a country inevitably faces a rapid growth in the elderly population and a decline in 
employable population. This is the challenge that Russia is facing now. The existing age and gender 
composition of the Russian population predetermines the inevitable decline of employable populations 
within the coming decades. After all, the number of persons leaving employable age will exceed the 
numbers entering it. This process started in Russia in 2007 and remains sustainable. An annual decline 
in employable populations, according to Rosstat forecasts, will be over 1 million a year in 2012-2017 
and 0.5 million on average 2018-2025 (fig. 2). Altogether in the course of 2012-2025 the employable-
age population will drop by 12 million. On the other hand, the number of persons older than 60 will 
increase by 8 million over the same period (Vishnevsky 2010). 
 
Fig. 2. Decline of employable-age population in Russia, 2008-2025, thousands  
Source: Rosstat Forecast, medium scenario. 
This kind of a demographic forecast is a challenge for the social and economic polices of the state. 
An increase in retirement age is an inevitable, but politically dangerous and rather inefficient measure 
from the standpoint of the labour markets. Persons older than 60, even if forced to work, are unlikely 
to be full-fledged labour market players, especially given health levels in the Russian Federation. 
Their experience is often not called for in the context of fast developing technologies, and their low 
susceptibility to innovations, easy to explain in age terms, makes them outsiders for the modernization 
demanded by the government.  
                                                     
2The fast growth of Russian GDP between 2002 and 2008 was only due to favourable prices for energy sources on the world 
market that provided for the growth of the federal budget and led to an increase in investments in the Russian economy. 
A steep fall in Russian GDP (-7%) in 2009 confirms the conjunctural character of the previous growth and the overall 
volatile character of the Russian economy which so clearly depends on the export of oil and gas. A decrease in the 
dependency ratio did not become a growth factor for the Russian economy, whereas the predicted steep increase in the 
number of the retired in 2010s will become a challenge.  
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5.2. Situation in the labour market 
Demography is not the only thing creating problems in the Russian labour market.  
A workforce deficit is, to a large extent, associated with a professional and qualification imbalance 
in workforce supply and demand. Russia has experienced a lack of skilled personnel in certain 
professions and occupations. This is primarily due to mismatch in the structure of professional 
education and in the existing and future needs of a labour market in terms of qualifications and 
professional structures. The country needs engineers, planners, bridge-builders, power engineers. 
While Russian higher education trains economists, lawyers, political scientists and psychologists, who 
have unreasonable salary demands, but who are not ready for practical work. As a result graduates 
with law degrees work as sales persons, while 30% of industrial enterprises (according to a 2005 
survey among enterprise managers) lack workers. Moreover, more than half of the missing jobs are 
skilled (Gimpelson et al. 2007). 
And another – new! – factor in the Russian labour market is the loss of motivation to work, disdain 
for physical work, and often a chronic unwillingness to work at all. That is why an “office job” (in 
whatever position) or the job of a salesperson or security guard turns out to be more prestigious than 
that of a construction worker, crane-man, driver, tailor, or cook, regardless of the salary. A manager is 
a hero in today’s Russia, while around 30 years ago the hero was a construction worker or a geologist. 
This can be partially explained by objective changes in labour market structure in a post-industrial 
economy with a new emphasis on the service sector.  
There is also the unwillingness of Russian citizens to work in a number of low-skilled professions 
with low salaries, harmful and dangerous working conditions, a high risk of occupational diseases, 
hard physical, and unskilled labour. However scientists, researchers, or university faculty members – 
extremely important for the knowledge-based economy – are not favored by Russians. 
Thus, a number of objective and market factors form a deficit in the Russian labour market and 
have led to structural deformations. Estimates of the Institute of Regional Policy demonstrate that the 
accumulated deficit in human resources in Russia will exceed 14 million by 2020. This deficit 
“threatens to become the most serious obstacle on the path of planned investment projects in the 
country” (Kolesnikova and Sokolova 2008). The number of vacant positions registered in employment 
services in Russia as a whole was sustainable over the past decade at more than 1 million vacancies 
(Rosstat 2011), and even the crisis of 2008-2009 failed to significantly reduce this figure.  
The problem can be resolved not only by recruiting foreign workers. Well thought-out state 
policies in education and employment would significantly improve the situation through both the 
secondary and higher education system: more rational placement of available labour resources; 
professional retraining programs; the involvement of the economically-inactive population; the 
recovery of labour incentives; and the creation of an attractive image of the working man etc. At the 
same time, policies for recruiting labour migrants is a crucial additional instrument in correcting the 
situation in the labour market.  
5.3. The Foreign workforce in the Russian labour market 
5.3.1. Scale 
Foreign workers arrived in Russia in the mid-1990s. In 1994 around 130,000 foreign nationals 
officially entered Russia for employment and obtained work permits there. Then, in 1996, the number 
of labour migrants increased to almost 300,000. The visa-free regime for citizens of most post-Soviet 
countries created favorable conditions for them in terms of job-seeking. A common language also 
played a crucial role in the emergence of a Russian migration vector in the CIS space.  
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It is surprising, that labour migration flows from Russia were formed in a profound economic crisis 
that accompanied reforms in the Russian economy. However, the economic situation in some post-
Soviet republics was even worse. Some, indeed, experienced the disruption of economic and 
production ties with Russia and other former Soviet countries; a mass outflow of population, including 
professionals and the fascination of national elites with political self-assertion to the detriment of 
economic development. All this resulted in a drastic fall in production, high unemployment and a 
catastrophic decline in the living standards of most citizens in the new sovereign states. It turns out 
that the main reason for migration was not so much Russian economic attractiveness in the 1990s, but 
rather the fact that economic opportunities for the population in other former Soviet republics were 
reduced to a bare minimum. In the meantime, the Russian economic system was decentralized through 
reforms: significant economic freedoms were granted to the regions and enterprises were given greater 
autonomy, private entrepreneurship expanded, and the economy became more commerce-oriented. 
This created demand for additional workforces in certain regions and production sectors. All this 
triggered labour migration in Russia. The total number of foreign workers, officially recruited to work 
in Russia, from 1994 to 2011, was over 13 million.  
In fig. 3 attention is drawn to the fact that up until mid-2000s the number of foreign workers 
attracted from CIS and from other countries was practically the same, and in some years “other 
country” were more numerous than CIS workers. This can be explained by the fact that until 2007 the 
procedures according to which residence and work permits were issued to citizens of the “new” and 
“old” abroad were the same for employers and for migrants. Visa-free entry to the Russian territory for 
CIS citizens “crashed” against complex, multistage, over-bureaucratic procedures for issuing work 
permits. Cue labour migrants from the former Soviet republics in Russia being forced into illegal 
employment.  
Fig. 3. Size of the foreign workforce in Russia, 1994-2011, thousand people  
(based on work permits issued)  
 
* Data for 2011 include only work permits issued within the quota. 
Source: Data of the Russian Federal Migration Service 
It is important to keep in mind that the plot in figure 3 reflects only the officially recruited foreign 
workforce. Illegal migration is not there in the statistics. However, by the early 2000s illegal migration 
and unregistered employment from CIS countries grew. According to estimates, 70-80% of labour 
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migrants in Russia worked illegally, without entering into official labour relations with employers 
(Problems of illegal migration... 2004). The visa-free entry regime combined with extremely 
complicated procedures for processing permits and weak immigration control pushed labour migrants 
into the “gray” sector.  
Reform of Russian migration legislation in 2006-2007 simplified procedures for obtaining work 
permits for citizens of those CIS countries with which Russia has a visa-free entry regime. It also 
expanded the legal channels of temporary employment for these citizens. This meant a radical change 
in migration policy principles with regards to labour migrants from CIS countries. Thus Russia 
demonstrated that these states were the ones it considered to be its main migration partners. Fig. 3 
shows that immediately after the new laws had entered into force there was a significant increase in 
the number of CIS citizens coming to and working in Russia legally. In the course of 2007 alone – the 
first year after the new laws entered into force – around 7 million CIS citizens registered as migrants 
in Russia. In the same year, the Russian migration services issued over 1.7 million work permits to 
foreign citizens, 70% more than in 2006 and 2.5 times more than in 2005. The make-up of the foreign 
workforce in Russia legally also changed: now more than three quarters of registered migrant workers 
are citizens of CIS countries. This, of course, better reflects the situation on the ground than the 
numbers recorded in 2006.  
Data for 2007 and 2008 reflect the process of active foreign workforce legalization in response to 
facilitated procedures for obtaining official work and residence permits in Russia. However, this 
process was interrupted by the global financial crisis.  
Obviously after 2008 there was a decline in the number of work permits issued for labour migrants 
from both “new” and “old” abroad3. This is explained, on the one hand, by the impact of the global 
economic crisis that objectively reduced demand for foreign workers and, on the other hand, by the 
reform of Russian migration legislation. The deliberate restriction in the number of work permits 
issued for foreign labour migrants combined with the emergence of new employment channels in 
Russia. These new channels do not require work permits (highly-skilled professionals; migrants 
employed by physical persons), and led to a reduction of plot indicators in 2012-2011: For detailed 
information on Russian migration policy with regards to foreign workers see section 5.3.6.  
5.3.2. Composition  
There were also changes in the composition of foreign workers attracted to Russia by countries of 
origin. In the mid-2000s the list of workforce suppliers to the Russian labour market was headed by 
Ukraine, Turkey and China. But, by the end of the decade, the share of labour migrants from Central 
Asia, especially from Uzbekistan, increased notably. Uzberkistan is considered as a key migration 
donor for Russia due to its significant demographic potential: the population of Uzbekistan is almost 
30 million, with 17.5 million of employable age. In 2011, 28% of foreign citizens working legally in 
Russia were represented by immigrants from Uzbekistan. The citizens of Central Asian countries 
(Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan) account for almost two thirds of work permits issued in Russia 
every year (see fig. 4).  
                                                     
3 Such terminology as the “new” (“near”) and “old” (“far”) abroad have been in use in Russian since the breakup of the 
USSR. The “new” abroad covers the 15 NIS that emerged on the territory of the former USSR. The “old” abroad covers 
the rest of the world. This artificial distinction is meant to underline some sort of uniqueness of the post-soviet space, the 
remaining ties between the former Soviet republics, a facilitated travel regime (visa-free, the use of “internal” national 
passports, and even the USSR passport before 2000). Russian migration policy differentiates between the citizens of the 
“new” and “old” abroad, more precisely between citizens of the post-soviet states that enjoy a visa-free regime with 
Russia and the rest of the world. This differentiation is important with regards to the migration registration procedures, 
employment and the provision of a legal status or citizenship in Russia.  
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Fig. 4. Composition of foreign workforce attracted to Russia, by countries of origin, 2011, % 
(based on work permits issued) 
 
Source: Data of the Russian Federal Migration Service 
The sectoral composition of migrant employment is characterized by the migrants’ domination of 
construction – around 40%, which conforms to the trends typical for most recipient countries (IOM 
2008). Table 1 gives an idea about the composition of foreign labour migrants’ employment in Russia 
in 2006-2010 by main types of economic activity, as they are classified by Rosstat. It is noteworthy 
that before the global crisis – which began in 2008 and became more pronounced in 2009 – the 
number of foreign workers employed in construction increased by more than a third annually. While 
the number of people employed in social and personal services and utilities increased six times in 
2006-2008 alone.  
The second economic activity in terms of foreign workers was wholesale and retail trade and 
maintenance: 16.6% of the overall number of recruited foreign workers in 2010. Construction and 
trade saw the biggest reduction in foreign workforce recruitment in 2010: construction by 42%, trade 
and maintenance by 34% compared to 2008. 
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Table 1. Distribution of foreign workers employed in Russia,  
by main types of economic activity, 2006-2010, thousand people 
Main types of 
economic 
activity 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
thousand 
people % 
thousand 
people % 
thousand 
people % 
thousand 
people % 
thousand 
people % 
Foreign 
workforce – 
total  
1014.0 100.0 1717.1 100.0 2425.9 100.0 2223.9 100.0 1640.8 100.0 
Construction 414.1 40.8 691.0 40.2 1020.8 42.1 876.5 39.5 595.1 36.2 
Wholesale and 
retail trade, 
repair of motor 
vehicles, 
household 
goods etc. 
270.9 26.7 330.0 19.2 411.1 16.9 408.0 18.3 272.1 16.6 
Processing 
industry 72.2 7.1 122.2 7.1 240.1 9.9 264.9 11.9 221.5 13.5 
Utilities, social 
and personal 
services 
28.9 2.8 120.9 7.0 206.8 8.5 245.4 11.0 221.2 13.5 
Agriculture and 
forestry 72.6 7.2 111.0 6.5 158.3 6.5 174.7 7.9 148.6 9.1 
Transport and 
communication 47.0 4.6 75.6 4.4 93.8 3.8 94.1 4.2 70.6 4.3 
Extraction of 
mineral 
resources 
20.0 2.0 36.1 2.1 54.3 2.2 45.2 2.0 33.2 2.0 
Other types of 
economic 
activity 
88.3 8.7 230.4 13.4 240.7 9.9 114.8 5.2 78.5 4.8 
Source: data of the Russian Federal Migration Service 
Geographically labour migrants gravitate towards certain Russian regions. They are primarily 
concentrated in: the Central Federal District (39% of all issued quota work permits for employment in 
Russia in 2011, 418,000 of 1,070,000 ); the North-West Federal District (20%); the Ural Federal 
District (11%); the Siberian Federal District (9%); and the Far-East Federal District (8.5%). Labour 
migrant concentrations can be better presented in their regional dimension. Moscow and the Moscow 
Region attract 18% of foreign workers in Russia. the Saint Petersburg and Leningrad Region attract 
17% and the Krasnodar Region, 5%. Regions with high economic growth and investment potential 
actively attract foreign workers: the Kaluga Region, the Sverdlovsk Region, the Khanty-Mansi 
Autonomous District and the Novosibirsk Region.  
Thus, the overall Russian share of foreign workers against the number of employed persons – 2.4% 
(2010) – glosses over significant regional differences. In Moscow, for instance, 6% of all employed 
persons are foreign. In the Chukotka Autonomous District the number is 12%, in the Sakhalin Region 
6%, and in the Jewish Autonomous Region 8%. It should be noted that we are talking here about the 
officially recruited legal foreign workforce alone.  
Russia is a large and varied country with diverse regional labour markets. A.V. Topilin and O.A. 
Parfentseva classify the Russian regions based on the impact of migration on regional labour markets. 
In doing so they have identified five types of regions, with different degrees of labour market 
completion, participation in the flows of internal labour migration, models of recruitment of external 
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labour migrants and degree of impact of foreign workforce upon local markets (based on trends 
formed by 2006)4 (Topilin and O.A. Parfentseva 2008: 51-60): 
Type 1: migration-attractive subjects of the Russian Federation with minimum or reduced tension 
in the labour market. These include Moscow, the Moscow Region, Saint Petersburg, the Leningrad 
Region, the Kaliningrad Region, the Tatarstan Republic etc. Here there are 21 regions, where the 
industrial and labour potential of the country is concentrated; 43.5% of the economically-active 
Russian population. These regions have 51% of vacancies announced by the employment services. 
Enhanced demand for workers attracts foreign migrants here and 65% of foreign workers in Russia are 
concentrated in these regions.  
Type 2: migration-attractive subjects of the Russian Federation with enhanced and maximum 
tension in the labour market. These include the Republic of Ingooshetia, the Republic of Adygea, the 
Krasnodar Territory and the Belgorod Region. Taken together there are 11 subjects of the Russian 
Federation, concentrating 13.4% of economically active Russians, mainly regions of the South and 
Center of Russia, specialized in industrial production and agriculture. Regions of this type are 
characterized by a low demand for workers. Therefore, they are not attractive for foreign workers. 5% 
of external labour migrants are employed here, and they do not exert significant pressure on regional 
labour markets.  
Type 3: subjects of the Russian Federation with migration outflow among the employable-age 
population with low and moderate tension in the labour market. These include the Chukotka 
Autonomous District, the Murmansk Region, the Sakhalin Region, the Astrakhan Region, the 
Republic of Sakha-Yakutia and the Kamchatka Region. Taken together these are 17 regions where 
15.3% of the economically active population is concentrated. These are mostly regions of the Far East 
and the Russian North. Demand for workers is relatively low; 16% of Russian vacancies are 
concentrated here. 7% of foreign workers in Russia are employed in these regions. But in certain 
sectors the share of foreign labour is high. For example, in the Chukotka Autonomous District the 
share of foreign workforce in construction, for instance, exceeds 57% of all employed persons.  
Type 4: subjects of the Russian Federation with migration outflow of employable-age population 
with enhanced tension in the labour market .These include the Krasnoyarsk Territory, the Republic of 
Khakassia, the Perm territory, the Republic of Bashkortostan, and the Smolensk Region. These 
amount to 11 regions, where 14% of the economically active population is concentrated. Here 7% of 
external labour migrants are employed; their share among employed persons is 2.5 times lower than 
the Russian average.  
Type 5: subjects of the Russian Federation with high intensity of migration outflow of employable-
age population and with maximum and enhanced tension in the labour market. These include the 
Magadan Region, the Komi Republic, the Kurgan Region, the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, the 
Republic of Kalmykia, the Dagestan Republic, the Primorski Territory and the Amur Region. Taken 
together here there are 19 Russian regions, with 12.7% of the economically active population. These 
are primarily regions of the Far East and the Russian South. Critical tension is observed in the labour 
markets of these regions. Unemployment here is higher than the Russian average. But foreign workers 
are also attracted to these regions (11% of the workforce). And the number of foreign workers among 
employed persons is sometimes significantly higher than the Russian average (for instance, in the 
Amur Region, the Chita Region and the Jewish Autonomous Region).  
The classification presented here proves yet again that Russia’s migration policy is in dire need of a 
regional dimension. It makes sense, from the economic standpoint, to grant greater independence to 
the regions in implementing foreign workforce recruitment models, models that would be more 
                                                     
4 The cited classification was built with the data on the geographic distribution of foreign labour force across Russian regions 
in 2006. The same data for 2011 is relatively similar to that of 2006. Therefore, we believe that the classification of 
Topilin and Parfentseva is valid for the current situation and we use it without adjustments. 
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appropriate for the local labour markets. This measure would help optimize the participation of foreign 
workforces in Russian economic development.  
5.3.3. Foreign workforce and Russian business 
In 2010 the Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion and Russian Public Organization for Small 
and Medium Business “Opora Rossii” (“Backbone of Russia”) carried out a survey of employers. This 
survey covered 1500 enterprises in 47 Russian regions and aimed to identify the scale of the 
“migration segment” in the Russian labour market. According to this survey, large enterprises are the 
most active recruiters of foreign workers (table 2). Large Russian enterprises were the first to recruit 
foreign workforce in the mid-1990s, primarily oil industry workers. Today the role of small and 
medium business in the use of migration resource is becoming increasingly pronounced. Among small 
businesses the “grey” practices of foreign workforce recruitment are more widespread than among 
large companies. Hence it may be that the number of small companies recruiting foreign workers is 
significantly higher than the share identified by the survey.  
Table 2.The share of Russian enterprises using foreign workers, 2009  
Size of enterprise 
Share of enterprises 
recruiting foreign 
workforce 
Large enterprises 
(personnel of more than 250 people, turnover more than 1 bln. roubles) 21.2% 
Medium enterprises 
(personnel from 100 to 250 people, turnover from 400 mln. to 1 bln. 
roubles) 
17.9%, 
Small enterprises 
(personnel of fewer than 100 people, turnover of less than 400 mln. 
roubles) 
8.8% 
Source: Study of the Russian Center for Study of Public Opinion (VTSIOM) and Russian Public Organization for Small and 
Medium Business “Opora Rossii” (Lunkin et al. 2010: 67) 
The above-mentioned research revealed that only 52% of small and medium enterprises hiring 
foreign workers did so officially, within the quota (Lunkin et al. 2010: 68). Others used “grey” 
recruitment schemes without obtaining the necessary permits, without the labour contracts, without 
paying taxes etc.  
The reasons for foreign recruitment are primarily structural: the unbalanced supply and demand 
structure of the Russian labour market. Structural motivation (“Russian workers do not want to do 
hard, dirty work”, “There is a lack of Russian personnel with the necessary qualifications”) was 
indicated by over 90% of respondents in the above-mentioned survey of employers (table 3). This 
indicates that the structure of the Russian labour market forces employers to recruit foreign workers 
and this is more important than production costs and profits. One of the structural reasons is a desire to 
find workers for jobs in the so-called flexible labour market associated with seasonality (“Migrants 
can be hired for a while”), indicated by almost a quarter of respondents.  
Reasons associated with savings on salary and taxes, according to this survey, are far less 
important: they were voiced by 40% of companies.  
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Table 3. Reasons for foreign recruitment by Russian companies, 2009 
(based on the survey of employers, in % of enterprises recruiting foreign workforce) 
 % of the number of respondents* 
Russian workers do not want to do hard, dirty work 46.1 
There is a lack of Russian personnel with the necessary qualifications 34.7 
Russian workers do not work well, are not disciplined 14.3 
Migrants can be hired for a while, regardless of season and fluctuations 23.2 
Migrants agree to lower salaries 24.6 
Lower expenses on social and pension payments (taxes, vacations, sick leaves 
etc.) 8.9 
Foreign workers can work overtime without extra pay 6.7 
* The sum is more than 100%, as respondents can indicate several reasons. 
Source: Study of the Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTSIOM) and Russian Public Organization for Small 
and Medium Business “Opora Rossii”, April-May 2010 (Vishnevsky 2011: 276). 
As in other migrant-accepting countries, companies in the Russian construction sector are the ones 
recruiting the highest number of foreign workers. The data for this sector allow us to trace a number of 
important characteristics in terms of the impact of the foreign presence for the Russian economy.  
From 2003 to 2008 the Russian economy experienced active growth. This depended to a large 
extent on high world prices for energy products, which stimulated the growth of the production and 
construction industries. The highest growth rates were observed in the construction sector: the average 
annual growth rate in this industry was 11% in 2003-2006 and 18% in 2007-2008. In order to fulfill 
the need for workers in this situation, contractors actively rely on the labour of migrants: around 40% 
of work permits for foreign nationals are issued in the construction sector. As a result the share of 
foreign workers in the Russian construction industry proved significantly higher than in the economy 
on average, and it was shooting up until the global economic crisis (table 4). In 2008 it was 18.3% of 
all persons employed in construction. In the course of 2005-2008 the size of foreign workforce 
officially recruited by the Russian construction industry increased almost 3.5 times.  
Table 4. Number of employed and share of foreign workers 
in the Russian construction industry, 2000-2008 
 2000 2001 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Number of employed in 
the sector  
(thousand people) 
4325 4385 4916 5073 5268 5560 
Number of foreign 
workers in the sector 
(thousand people) 
84 111 272 414 691 1020 
Share of foreign 
workforce in the sector 
(%) 
1.9 2.5 5.5 8.2 13.1 18.3 
Sources: Size and migration of the Russian population. Annual statistical collection. Moscow. Rosstat. Foreign workforce – 
FMS data.  
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One should also keep in mind that the highest share of violations a propos of the foreign workforce 
is in the construction industry (Krasinets et al. 2000; Problem of illegal migration... 2004; Human 
Rights Watch 2009). In other words, it is here that the illegally-recruited migrants are concentrated, 
while the overall number in Russia is estimated at 4-5 million people. Thus, in fact, the share of 
foreign workers in construction turns out to be almost twice as high.  
In 2008 every third construction organization in Russia indicated a lack of personnel as a factor 
restricting its business activity (Rosstat 2011b). In 2009-2010 the global economic crisis, as in most 
other countries, resulted in a slowing rate of construction sector growth and reduced “personnel 
hunger”. However, this problem will inevitably manifest itself in the course of the economic recovery.  
It is interesting to note that in the pre-crisis years labour productivity in construction demonstrated 
the highest growth rate compared to other Russian industries: with an average annual growth of 10-
12% (2006-2008)5. These data do not confirm the claim that the recruitment of a low-qualified foreign 
workforce slows down the growth of labour productivity in sectors with many foreign workers.  
It is also important to note that, though the highest share of increase in foreign workers 2001-2008 
was observed in construction, rapid salary growth was also observed in this sector. Over the same 
period average monthly nominal salary in construction increased seven times, which was no less than 
the growth of salary in the economy as a whole6. Thus, the myth about migrants reducing overall 
salary levels is refuted by Russian economic statistics.  
5.3.4. Foreign workers and unemployment 
Foreign workers in Russia are recruited in the context of local employment. According to the data of 
the Russian Federal Service for Labour and Employment, the number of the unemployed registered 
in the employment services varied between 1.2 and 1.5 million in 2000-2010 with 2 million in 2009, 
the year of crisis.7 According to the data provided by selective population surveys on employment 
issues carried out by Rosstat, there were around 5.5 million unemployed or 7.5% of the 
economically active population8.  
In the meantime the number of vacancies reported by enterprises to the employment services was 
sustainable at the level of 1.1 – 1.3 million with a reduction of 15% in the crisis year of 2009. 
Significant numbers of unfilled vacant positions indicates that unemployment in Russia is structural in 
nature. Put in other terms, it is generated by structural transformations in the labour market, in as much 
as the qualifications of Russian labour resources cannot transform the Russian economy. This raises 
the question of the need to reform the personnel training and retraining system. Meanwhile, the 
presence of migrants ready to occupy the lowest segments of the qualification staircase in the labour 
market “pushes” Russian citizens into the areas where higher qualifications are required and motivates 
them to train for those professions not satisfied by migrants.  
Many studies, including those carried out in the regions of migrant concentration, proved that the 
presence of foreign workforce in certain sectors of economy did not lead to increased unemployment 
among the locals (Metelev 2006; Ryazantsev 2007; Problem of illegal migration... 2004; 
Tyuryukanova 2004b, 2004b, etc.). A comparison of unemployment figures and the size of the foreign 
workforce across Federal Districts and the Russian Federation does not show a direct correlation. This 
suggests that labour migrants predominantly occupy those niches of the Russian labour market that, 
for one reason or another, cannot be filled by Russian workers.  
                                                     
5 http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat/rosstatsite/main/account/# 
6 http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b11_11/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d1/07-07.htm 
7 http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b11_11/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d1/06-08.htm 
8 http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b11_11/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d1/06-01.htm 
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Fig. 5 sets out that curves of unemployment indicators among the local population and shows how 
the size of the recruited foreign workforce mirror these curves. This was true at least before the crisis 
year of 2009: unemployment rises – recruitment of workers from abroad goes up. As a result of the 
crisis migration policies are tightened and channels of legal foreign workforce recruitment narrowed, 
primarily due to populist considerations. In fact, as experts have noted, the flow of labour migration 
directed to Russia was restructured in favor of its unregistered component (Zayonchkovskaya and 
Tyuryukanova 2010: 21). 
Fig. 5. Unemployed population and foreign workforce recruitment, 2000-2010, thousand people 
 
Notes  
(1) The unemployment level is defined on the basis of data from selective surveys of population about employment issues.  
(2) Data on the size of foreign workforce are determined on the basis of the number of work permits issued a year. 
Sources: data of Rosstat and Russian Federal Migration Service 
It is well known that migrants are a “buffer” in the labour market: they are the first to be fired when 
the economic situation deteriorates and demand for workers goes down. This was demonstrated by the 
Russian financial crisis of 1998 and the global crisis of 2008-2009. For instance, in 1995 the gas-
producing enterprise “Yamburggasdobycha” (Novy Urengoy) employed around 600 foreign workers 
and in 1999 the company forewent their services (Labour migration in Russia 2001: 87). In response 
to the global crisis of 2008-2009 many Russian employers not only laid off employees including 
foreign workers. They also changed their tactics in the labour market, expanding unregistered 
employment. “Grey” recruitment schemes, including the recruitment of foreign workers (preferably 
foreign, as they are less inclined to defend their rights and are less protected), were used by Russian 
employers striving to retain competitiveness in the face of shrinking demand, despite sizeable fines 
(IOM 2009: 35). 
Moreover, in a crisis labour migration continues (and illegal migration may even go up), as a 
number of economic sectors still need workers, never mind rising unemployment. This demand is 
explained by the fact that national workers either do not have the necessary qualifications or do not 
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want to do certain jobs, where unskilled workers or workers with low qualification are needed (IOM 
2009). For instance, in Russia in 2008-2009 there were, of course, sectors where the number of jobs 
went down: construction, production and the financial sector. However, there were also sectors where 
demand for workforce remained high: housing and utilities, municipal public transport, and the service 
sector. A significant share of vacancies in these sectors was filled by the redistribution of migrants, 
who were more flexible in employment strategies than local Russian workers who preferred temporary 
unemployment and social benefits to reduced social status (IOM 2009). 
5.3.5. Labour market segmentation and “migrant niches”  
Despite the fact that the foreign workers constitutes fewer than 2.5% of those employed in the Russian 
economy, a number of industries and regions have a greater dependence on foreign workers. For 
instance, as was mentioned above, the share of officially employed foreign workers in the construction 
industry was 18.3% in 2008, and if we take into account illegally employed migrants that number goes 
up to at least a quarter. As a matter of fact auxiliary low-qualified work in construction turned into a 
“migrant niche” in the labour market, together with the cleaning of houses and offices; the repair of 
cars, motorcycles, and household appliances; auxiliary work in wholesale and retail. Russian citizens 
reject these types of work as hard, dirty and “beneath them”.  
There was a survey of foreign workers from CIS countries in a number of Russian regions in 2008-
2009 carried out by the Center of Migration Research, the Institute for Economic Forecasting and the 
Russian Academy of Sciences. This survey demonstrates that most migrants are employed in jobs 
filled in almost exclusively by migrants (fig. 6). Only 15% of migrants noted that they worked among 
local people, and 18% that they were surrounded by migrants and local workers. This confirms that 
migrants already occupied certain economic niches that, apparently, will only expand in the future. In 
many Russian regions, especially in the large cities and megacities, foreign workers have become a 
structural factor in economies that can no longer efficiently function without migrants. 
Fig. 6.Selective survey of foreign workers from CIS countries working in Russia (2008-2009): 
responses of migrants to the question “Who works with you at your enterprise or workplace?” (%)* 
 
* The survey was led by E.V. Tyuryukanova and carried out by the Center of Migration Research, Institute for Economic 
Forecasting, Russian Academy of Sciences. Sample: 1575 foreign workers from CIS countries in six regions of the European 
part of Russia: Moscow and the Moscow Region, the Saint Petersburg and Leningrad Region, the Voronezh Region, the 
Astrakhan Region, the Krasnodar Territory and the Tatarstan Republic. 
Source: Zayochkovskaya and Tyuryukanova 2010: 41. 
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28% of migrants feel that they compete with local workers for their jobs and significantly more 
– 37% – feel that they compete with other migrants (Zayonchkovskaya and Tyuryukanova 2010: 41). 
The Economic crisis of 2008-2009 demonstrated that even under conditions of increased 
unemployment Russian citizens did not rush to fill those jobs that would bring about significant 
reduction in their professional and social status. Rather they preferred to turn to unemployment 
benefits (IOM 2009). One can suggest that, as the economic niches of migrant employment become 
deeper, competition between migrants and locals will go down, while competition between migrants 
will go up. This refutes the myth, widespread in Russian society, that migrants take away jobs from 
Russians.  
A survey among labour migrants from CIS countries employed in the informal labour market of 
Moscow, carried out in 2002, had interesting results here. It revealed that over 50% of migrants 
working in this sector of the Moscow economy did not feel that they competed with the locals for jobs 
(Tyuryukanova 2004a). Apparently this is explained by the higher living standards of the Moscow 
population, as well as by a clearer division of labour between locals and migrants than is found in 
other Russian regions. This clear division is a result of intensive migration into the Moscow Region 
over the last twenty years.  
There is a significant share of jobs in the Russian labour market occupied by migrants – from 
50% in Moscow to 35% in the regions – that are effectively “reserved” for migrants. The remaining 
jobs are “won” by migrants in competition with the locals. Migrants have the following advantages: 
dumping labour prices; willingness to work longer hours and higher labour intensity than in case of 
local workers; not to mention the absence of claims to social benefits. Migrants are especially 
attractive in the eyes of employers because they are more disciplined: they do not abuse alcohol, and 
they do not get distracted by family issues. 
Fig. 7 indicates those employed in Russia by main economic sectors and shows how this differs 
from the foreign workforce. The sectoral composition of the Russian population is gradually 
transforming itself in favor of service and sector domination. In the present graph the service sector 
comprises transport, communication, trade, catering, healthcare, education, public administration, 
culture and science. At the same time the share of industry and agriculture goes down. This trend is 
typical for all post-industrial states. Those economic sectors that require a significant volume of hard 
unskilled labour use foreign workers to fill vacant positions that local workers do not agree to fill in 
the context of a labour deficit and innovation-based economic development.  
Fig. 7. 
Sources: Rosstat; Russian Federal Migration Service 
At the same time there are labour market segments where, as international experience 
demonstrates, it is apparently impossible to recruit national human resources. This is, in Russia, due to 
forthcoming structural changes in the labour market, inevitably associated with population ageing and 
the corresponding growth of demand for services associated with care for the elderly. By 2025 there 
will be 8 million people aged 60 years plus, and the number of the most senior groups of population 
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demanding special care will increase rapidly. This sector has not yet become widespread in Russia, 
and the range of gerontological services on offer is limited, but it will inevitably expand. Judging by 
trends in other countries, which have already faced the problem of ageing population, nursing home 
staff, nurses, and social workers will often be migrants, most likely women. This will thus feminize 
the labour flow and render gender aspects of international labour migration more significant. 
Another factor of migrant labour growth in the service sector will be associated with the increased 
prosperity of the Russian population and the active recruitment of personnel by households: household 
assistants, cooks, gardeners, nannies, tutors, private teachers etc. For Russian women actively 
participating in the labour market and entrepreneurship, nannies are, in fact, the single most important 
condition for participation. According to estimates, three million Russian families use nannies, and 2 
million nannies are foreign.  
Growing demand for female migrant labour is reflected by the work permit statistics issued, as well 
as by sociological research data. More and more women come to Russia to earn money by themselves 
or with husbands or other family members. The male-female ratio among foreign workers obtaining 
permits for work in Russia has remained the same for many years in Russia: 85% of labour migrants 
are men and 15% are women. However, given the growth of the officially recruited foreign workforce, 
one can see that in absolute terms 15% of the migrant flow equaled 81,000 in 2004 and 322,000 in 
2009. Thus, one third of a million women come to Russia as independent labour migrants and 
participate in the Russian labour market. Besides this, taking into account illegal migration and 
unregistered migrant employment in Russia, one can assume that the number of female foreign 
nationals working in the Russian labour market is, in fact, much higher. Sociological survey data 
carried out in 2009-2010 show that women now constitute 25-30% of the labour migrant flow from 
CIS countries (UNIFEM-ILO 2009:23),1.5 – 2 million. The share of female migrants varies from 
country to country: one third of labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan are women, and more than half of 
those from Ukraine.  
The feminization of migration flows is acknowledged by migration experts as a characteristic 
feature of the contemporary world (OSCE 2009). It is a response of the international labour market to 
growth in demand for services that are predominantly in the female employment sphere: housework, 
houses and office cleaning, childcare, care for elderly people, as well as sexual services. Russian data 
confirm this trend: three quarters of female migrants working in Russia are employed in the service 
sector; and almost half are employed by physical persons (Tyuryukanova 2011). The problem here is 
that female migrant employment is predominantly “grey” and marginal. Put in other terms, this is part 
of the labour market that has only weak social and labour standards with high levels of professional 
risk. A growing inflow of female migrants, often ready to work without a labour contract, means 
migrant enclaves with “grey” labour relations and the risk of deceit, physical violence, psychological 
pressure, and exploitation. A high degree of “enclavization” in the main sectors of female migrant 
employment is confirmed by the fact that in surveys around 40% of female respondents claim that they 
do not feel competition in their working places from local workers, believing that locals do not want 
the work that they perform, and only 16% indicate that there is competition (Tyuryukanova 2011: 39).  
The segmentation of the Russian labour market is also a result of “ethnic business” emerging in a 
number of Russian cities: enterprises belonging to immigrants who hire, predominantly, their own 
compatriots. Sometimes these compatriots are illegal and there is also an ethnically determined 
infrastructure that serves these ethnic enterprises. Ethnic business stimulates a constant inflow of 
migrants and often forms “grey” networks of intermediary services acting as an alternative to the 
official migration infrastructure (Dyatlov 2003). 
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5.3.6. Evaluation of the labour migrants’ contribution to the Russian economy  
In Russia migration is very politicized and surrounded with myths, which hinders impartial 
assessments of labour migrants’ contribution to the economy. Politicians and citizens regard the 
presence of foreign workers in the Russian labour market and their role in Russian economic 
development as a controversial issue. “The ideology of anti-migrationism” (Tishkov 2011) is 
neither supported nor suppressed at the official level and becomes an unpleasant backdrop to the 
formation of public opinion and the formulation of migration policies. Thus, the question “Does 
Russia need migrants?”, widely discussed in the mass media, by politicians, migration officials 
and even experts, has not yet been answered unequivocally. This can be explained, to a large 
extent, by the absence of complex credible studies on the role played by international labour 
migration in Russian economic development.  
The global economic crisis of 2008-2009 aggravated the issue of foreign recruitment in the Russian 
labour market. Some government officials, representatives of trade unions and journalists suggest 
introducing a visa regime for CIS countries, banning the employment of foreign nationals, deporting 
all migrants who find themselves without work, and banning the recruitment of a foreign workforce. 
These suggestions demonstrate that there is a strong force in society refusing to acknowledge the 
positive role of migration in the strategic development of contemporary Russia. According to opinion 
polls, regularly carried out by the Analytical Center of Yury Levada (Levada-Center), in 2008, 
practically half of Russian citizens were convinced that “Russia needs neither immigrants, nor labour 
migrants” (Public opinion – 2008: 124). And since then the dominant attitude to migration and 
migrants in the country has become steadily more negative (Public opinion - 2011: 132-133). 
It was at the height of anti-migrant feelings, in autumn 2008, that the Russian Federal Migration 
Service (FMS) for the first time voiced its assessment of the economic contribution that migrants 
make. FMS director Konstantin Romodanovsky acknowledged that labour migrants from CIS 
countries working in Russia created 6-8% of GDP (Romodanovsky 2008). Scholars have pushed an 
even higher figure, namely, 8-9% of GDP.9  
Another assessment, voiced by the FMS director in 2010, was supposed to puncture the myth that 
migrants take money out of Russia. “For each dollar earned by a guest worker, the Russian budget gets 
up to 6 dollars”. These words of Konstantin Romodanovsky reflect the opinion of experts that foreign 
workers in Russia add value over and above their salary and the savings sent or taken home. Besides, 
migrants are not only producers, but also consumers, and they spend part of their earnings in Russia. 
Therefore, indicators of an increase in the remittances from Russia to the other CIS countries (table 5) 
reflect not only the real scale of the money drain from Russia, but also a number of other changes: 
apart from those mentioned above, this includes the general growth of salary in the country, as well as 
the more frequent use of official money transferring channels by migrants. 
                                                     
9 Estimated by E.V. Tyuryukanova: Russia Today, July 11, 2007, http://www.russiatoday.ru/guests/detail/239  
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Table 5.Migrants’ remittances from Russia to the other CIS countries, made via official money 
transferring systems, 2006-2011, million dollars  
 2006* 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
CIS countries 4674 8575 12609 8919 11080 15143 
Azerbaijan 378 653 887 661 794 1049 
Armenia 531 943 1249 848 1018 1284 
Belarus 37 71 100 96 165 151 
Georgia** 300 558 683 517 566 669 
Kazakhstan 73 124 187 159 247 363 
Kyrgyzstan 384 715 1157 894 1106 1547 
Moldova 457 806 1114 746 845 1076 
Tajikistan 835 1632 2516 1725 2216 3015 
Uzbekistan 866 1666 2978 2052 2845 4262 
Ukraine 800 1377 1690 1339 1809 2360 
* Data on II-IV quarters of 2006. 
** In 2009 Georgia stopped being a CIS Member State, but we include the data on Georgia in order to keep intact the 
dynamic time series. 
Source : Russian Central Bank.  
http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/print.aspx?file=CrossBorder/Rem_countries_11.htm&pid=svs&sid=TGO_sp_post 
At the same time the dominance of unregistered employment excludes a significant part of labour 
migrants from the taxation system, which leads to direct financial losses in Russia (see section 5.4). 
In public discussions on migration there is the persistent claim that migrants do not positively 
contribute to the Russian economy while their contribution to criminality is taken as a given. In order 
to confirm this claim, references are made to the data from the Russian Ministry of Interior, according 
to which more than half of crimes in Russia are allegedly committed by migrants. Indeed, in 2005 the 
head of Moscow Main Department of Internal Affairs said in his interview that 60% of crimes in 
Moscow were committed by non-residents. This phrase was incorrectly interpreted and disseminated 
by the mass media in such a way that foreigners become the key criminals in the capital (and hence in 
the country). In fact “non-residents” are mostly internal migrants coming to Moscow from other 
Russian regions. Foreign citizens are responsible for 3–3.5% of all solved crimes in Russia, and the 
most widespread type of offence among foreign nationals is the use of false documents. Table 6 
constructed on the basis of the official website of the Russian Ministry of Interior unequivocally 
indicates that migrants’ association with crime is a myth disseminated by xenophobes. 
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Table 6. Number and share of crimes committed by foreign citizens in the Russian Federation, 
2003-2009 
Year 
Total number of 
crimes registered 
(thousand people) 
Crimes solved 
(thousand 
people) 
Crimes committed by foreign citizens and stateless 
persons 
Thousand 
people 
% of registered 
crimes 
% of solved 
crimes 
2011 2404.8 1311.8 45.0 1.9 3.4 
2010 2628.8 1431.0 48.9 1.9 3.4 
2009 2994.8 1651.0  58.0  1.9 3.5 
2008 3209.9 1713.0 53.9 1.7 3.1 
2007 3582.5 1775.2 50.1 1.4 2.8 
2006 3855.4 1794.5  53.0 1.4 3.0 
2005 3554.7 1698.7 51.2 1.4 3.0 
2004 2893.8 1569.3 48.9 1.7 3.1 
2003 2756.4 1518.7 40.6 1.5 2.7 
Source: Calculated on the basis of data of official criminal statistics: http://www.mvd.ru/presscenter/statistics/reports/ 
5.4. Illegal labour migration in Russia 
The scale of illegal labour migration and unregistered migrant employment is the most acute 
migration problem in Russia. Estimates of the number of illegal migrants in Russian vary from 1.5 
to 20 million. Even if we put aside extreme assessments, dictated by political and economic 
considerations, justified estimates of the number of illegal migrants are extremely difficult to come 
by. This is due to weak immigration control, the unavailability of unified data on migrants, and the 
weak coordination of actions by border and migration services. In most cases even the methodology 
of estimates is not disclosed.  
Our own estimates rely on: migration flow classification; data on the number of persons detained at 
the border and on the numbers deported; estimates of the “grey” sector of the labour market; data on 
migrants’ money transfers; surveys of labour migrants in different Russian regions; as well as 
information from migrants’ countries of origin. As a result, according to our estimates, there are 3-4 
million residents illegally present in Russia. This number goes up to 5-7 million in spring and 
summer, when seasonal workers arrive. The distribution of illegal migrants across regions and 
employment spheres generally corresponds to the distribution of legal migrants. Approximately one 
third are based in the Moscow Region; other locations include large cities like Saint Petersburg, 
Novosibirsk, Yekaterinburg, the Krasnodar Territory, as well as quickly developing oil and gas 
producing regions e.g. the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous District and the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous 
District. Like legal migrants, illegal migrants are predominantly employed in construction, trade and 
the service sector. One can meet them in the open markets and construction sites. They are often 
involved in the construction of private houses.  
Illegal migration in Russia has special features. It depends in part on the visa-free regime with most 
post-Soviet countries. However, to a much larger extent, it is a result of poor migration legislation in 
the 1990s, when migrant registration procedures and work permits proved so difficult to get that they, 
in fact, pushed migrants and employers recruiting foreign workers into illegality (Krasinets et al. 
2000). For Russian employers the procedure for getting and confirming permits for foreign workers is 
time consuming and, very often, involves bribes to public officials. Meanwhile, thousands of job 
applicants from CIS countries were already present in Russian territory and were ready to start 
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working, practically on any terms. This stimulated the sustainable illegal recruitment of foreign 
citizens, whereas control over employment was weak and fines for violations were insignificant.  
In the 2000s illegal migration was declared an issue of national security in Russia and all aspects of 
migration policy regulation were transferred to the Ministry of Interior. In these circumstances the 
authorities expected a serious and efficient offensive against illegal migration with a consequent 
reduction in its scale. At the same time, it was “forgotten” that illegal migration to Russia was only a 
special form of labour migration and that those who came to Russia legally under a visa-free regime 
were almost always seeking employment (Iontsev 2005). Even some experts equate illegal migration 
and criminal migration and make unsubstantiated statements: e.g. “illegal migrants make a significant 
contribution towards financing “grey” and criminal organizations” (Metelev 2006: 80).  
As a matter of fact, an offensive against migration in the 2000s was counterproductive. Police raids 
against illegal migrants, detentions and deportations, checks on enterprises for illegally working 
foreigners etc. all resulted in an increase, rather than a reduction in the scale of illegal migration.  
The migrant registration procedure stipulated by the law turned, deliberately or unintentionally, 
into a powerful weapon against legal migration. Bureaucratic obstacles became, for most migrants, an 
insurmountable barrier on the path towards legal employment: delays with registration, numerous 
visits to public officials, long queues, absence of clear information about procedures etc. Legal 
migration channels are narrowed down, and this has provoked migration-related corruption: the 
emergence of “grey” services, the issuing of false registration documents and work permits, bribery of 
migration service employees etc.. As a result, a powerful “grey” infrastructure has formed for the 
illegal employment of migrants. It consisted, for the most part, of intermediaries representing the 
countries of origin and “supplying” the labour for their compatriots to the Russian labour market.  
The negative consequences of the protracted and inefficient fight against illegal migration are as 
follows. Russian employers until recently did not face the threat of significant fines for the illegal 
recruiting of foreign workers and now they have the “habit” of illegally hiring foreign workers. The 
excessive exploitation of illegal migrants creates additional competitive advantages for employers, 
while widespread corruption in the migration sphere makes unscrupulous employers “untouchable” 
before the law. An obvious benefit of using illegal foreign workforce, despite government 
countermeasures, is the preservation of a sustainable “grey” sector in the labour market. Even a fine of 
up to 800,000 roubles (!) for the illegal recruitment of one foreign worker is inefficient: after all, in 
practice one can bribe one’s way out of trouble with a much smaller sum of money.  
The joint survey of employers carried out in 2010 by the Russian Center for the Study of Public 
Opinion and the Russian Public Organization of Small and Medium Business “Opora Rossii” came to 
several interesting conclusions. It identified the main reasons that Russian employers hire foreign 
workers unofficially, with an oral agreement and so with no signed contract (table 7). Most employers 
taking part in the survey indicated that the procedures for migrant registration were too difficult, too 
time-consuming and too expensive. This is primarily true in applying for the quota, reporting the 
vacant positions to the employment service, rules of taxation of foreign citizens etc. The answers 
given by representatives of small and medium businesses were practically identical (Lunkin et al. 
2010: 69). The de facto lack of rights of illegally working migrants is also an important incentive: one 
can pay them less, it is easier to fire them and they are easier to manage. 
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Table 7. Reasons for the illegal recruitment of foreign workers(based on a survey of employers 
representing small and medium businesses,in % of the overall number of answers) 
 Small business Medium business 
One can pay less to illegal migrants 23 26 
One can save on deductions and taxes 22 22 
Illegal migrant is easier to fire, punish and manage 21 20 
Official registration is complicated – it is too time- and cost-
consuming 36 36 
Other 2 5 
Source: Survey of the Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTSIOM) and Russian Public Organization of Small 
and Medium Business “Opora Rossii”, April-May 2010 (Lunkin et al. 2010: 68) 
Widespread illegal migration and the illegal employment of foreign citizens is associated with 
considerable financial losses for Russia in the form of unpaid taxes. One and a half million foreign 
workers employed legally in Russia paid no less than 70 billion roubles in taxes in 2011, if one relies 
on average salary figures. Illegally working migrants do not, of course, pay income tax. Let us 
assumes that in Russia between four and five million migrants work without official contracts and that 
they are paid without reference to the taxation system. In that case 150-200 billion roubles are lost to 
the Russian exchequer annually.  
However, this is not necessarily a choice on the part of migrants, but rather they are forced to act in 
this way by circumstances. The reason for the dissemination of informal forms of employment is 
associated with the scale of the “grey” sector in the Russian labour market. Hence the problem of tax 
shortfalls from foreign workers (something that is also true of Russian citizens) is an “internal” 
Russian problem that has been worsened, not created by the inflow of labour migrants. 
5.5. Labour migration from Russia 
It should be noted here that the real scale of legal migration from Russia is not fully reflected in 
Russian statistics. Official figures published by Rosstat (Rosstat 2009) include persons legally 
employed abroad relying on intermediary companies who have special licenses for their services. 
Those who found jobs abroad by themselves are left out of statistical reports, likewise those who went 
abroad to earn money without a work visa, for instance, via the mediation of tourist agencies. This is 
true, for example, of those who look for a job in the entertainment industry: dancers or administrators 
of hotels in resort areas where a lot of tourists from Russia and other CIS countries spend their 
vacations. What is more, official statistics do not include the activities of large oil, metallurgic, nuclear 
and other industrial companies that build facilities abroad both on commercial terms and within 
bilateral intergovernmental agreements. These companies then offer jobs to Russian specialists, 
without licenses for foreign economic activity. Finally, illegal labour migrants who leave on tourist 
visas and who then violate the terms of stay by working illegally are also absent from the statistics.  
Thus, the available employment statistics for Russians abroad is based on activities of companies 
with licenses and covers only those who found employment with the help of intermediaries. In 2008, 
73,000 in 2010 a little more than 70,000 Russian citizens got jobs abroad this way, and this number is 
constantly growing: in 1994 this figure was only 8,000. Table 8 demonstrates that Russian labour 
migrants find jobs in all parts of the world, though the US is the most attractive country for them: 
every sixth labour migrant from Russia finds a job in the United States (Rosstat 2009).  
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Table 8. Distribution of Russian citizens departing for employment abroad, by regions of the 
world, 2000-2010, thousand people 
 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total 
(persons) 45.760 47.637 56.290 60.926 65.747 69.866 73.130 66.285 70.236
including (%):          
In countries of 
Europe 48,3 34,2 30,1 36,0 30,1 30,2 28,5 29,5 28,3 
In countries of 
Asia 37,9 44,8 37,6 31,4 25,9 24,0 24,3 25,1 22,1 
In countries of 
America 10,4 14,5 20,6 23,5 35,1 33,9 35,9 33,1 34,6 
In countries of 
Africa 3,3 5,5 10,4 7,3 6,8 6,7 6,6 7,8 9,2 
In Australia and 
Oceania 0,1 1,0 1,4 1,8 2,1 5,2 4,7 4,6 5,8 
Source: Rosstat data: Labour and employment in Russia - 2011. http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b11_36/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d1/05-
19.htm 
The distribution of Russian citizens who left to work abroad by education level demonstrates the 
high “quality” of the departing workforce (fig. 8). 72.8% of labour migrants from Russia have a 
professional education, and almost half of them have university degrees. This does not mean, of 
course, that all of them find jobs suitable to their degrees in other countries. However, neither can 
there be any doubt that is a loss for the Russian economy suffering as that economy does from a lack 
of professional personnel. The educational level of labour migrants departing from Russia is 
significantly higher than the Russian average. According to the Russian census of 2010, the share of 
Russian citizens with higher and secondary professional education is 58%, which is almost a quarter 
lower than among those labour migrants leaving Russia for employment abroad (Rosstat 2010).  
Fig. 8. The distribution of Russian citizens working abroad, by level of education, 2008, % 
 
http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b09_36/Main.htm 
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Unfortunately, we cannot compare the educational level of labour migrants leaving Russia and 
those labour migrants entering Russia, as data for the second group are not collected. However, we 
know the distribution by education level of immigrants entering Russia for permanent residence. 
Among immigrants aged 14 and above the share of persons having higher and secondary professional 
education is 42% (Rosstat 2011a). Despite the arbitrary nature of this comparison, we can conclude 
that the educational level of those who consider Russia a migration-attractive country is significantly 
lower than the level of those who wish to leave Russia to work in other countries.  
As one can see from table 9, one third of Russian citizens leaving to work abroad represent 
professional groups of executives (directors, sea and river vessel captains, foremen, and managers) and 
specialists. The share of professionals in engineering and technology is especially high: engineers, 
technicians, mechanics, urban planners etc.. The maritime professions represent half of working 
occupations: sailors, skippers, boatswains, which, is associated with the drastic reduction in the 
Russian commercial sea fleet. It is also though testimony to the reputation of Russian sailors on the 
global labour market.  
Table 9. Distribution of Russian citizens departing to work abroad, by professional groups, 
2000-2010, thousand people 
 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total  45,8 47,6 56,3 60,9 65,7 69.9 73,1 66,3 70,2
including:     
Executives 8,3 8,0 9,8 10,7 11,1 12,4 12,5 11,8 13,1
Specialists 13,7 13,8 16,1 16,8 17,0 19,4 19,7 18,5 20,0
Workers 23,7 21,6 23,9 24,0 22,9 24,7 26,3 25,6 23,6
Other  0,1 4,2 6,5 9,4 14,7 13,4 14,6 10,3 13,5
Note: Professional groups is recorded at the time of departure in accordance with the Russian classifier of working 
professions, clerk positions and wage categories.  
Source: Data of Rosstat: Labour and employment in Russia – 2009. http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b09_36/Main.htm 
Two thirds of Russian labour migrants leaving Russia to work abroad leave for up to 6 months, 
23% for six months to one year and only 8% for longer than one year. It is interesting that in 2004, 
31% got employed for more than one year. The reduced duration of professional activity among 
Russian labour migrants abroad is partially due to the increased flow of students working during 
vacations (Topilin and Parfentseva 2008: 42). 
The total number of labour migrants annually departing from Russia is at least 120,000-160,000. 
Though to arrive at this number we need to expand the official statistical definition of foreign 
employment and, at least approximately, estimate the number of those who work abroad without 
resorting to official Russian intermediaries,. Among them, no doubt, there are a lot of people 
employed in various sectors: construction and seasonal agricultural jobs, hospitality in various 
countries, especially resort areas, in the so-called female types of work including household assistance, 
child care, care for the elderly etc. Then too there are a good many highly-qualified professionals 
invited by foreign companies that “headhunt” in Russia as well as the rest of the world. Estimates of 
the overall number of Russians working abroad vary from 1.5 million (IOM 2002: 119) to 10 million 
(Ryazantsev 2007: 241). At the same time S.V. Ryazantsev points to important socio-economic 
functions performed by the Russian “labour diaspora”. In addition to money transfers and investments 
in the Russian economy, the diaspora brings development and promotes projects with Russian partners 
in business, trade, science and technology, education etc. (Ryazantsev 2007: 274).  
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According to the data of the Russian Central Bank, money transfers from Russian migrants from 
overseas amounted to 4,788,000 USD in 201010. Returning migrants bring new professional skills and 
production experience. However the Russian economy also bears the costs associated with the labour 
migration of Russian citizens abroad. First of all, as there is a decline in employment-age population 
and a deficit in skilled workers in Russia, any drain on Russian workers can be considered as reducing 
Russia’s labour potential: particularly when many have good professional characteristics and 
important qualifications (Topilin and Parfentseva 2008:45). Second, brain drain has a painful impact 
upon the state of the Russian economy. The drain in intellectual resources weakens Russia’s 
technological prowess: a decline in research and development, loss of research areas and Russian 
scientific schools, many of which at the moment hold the leading positions in world science (for 
instance, in mathematics and biology). American economists have calculated the added value created 
by intellectual labour. Based on these calculations, the minimum Russian losses from brain drain were 
estimated at 45-50 billion USD annually in the 1990s (Ushkalov 1998). Third, the departure of young 
researchers and postgraduate students aggravates the problem of research personnel reproduction.  
5.6. Migration policy with regards to international labour migration 
A brief analysis of Russian migration policy is needed here. After all, the specific features of 
migration legislation and the implementation thereof help determine trends in international labour 
migration to Russia. They affect its structure, the dominance of unregistered forms of employment 
and, in the end, the impact of labour migration on the Russian labour market and economic 
development.  
Russian legislation regulating international labour migration started in the early 1990s, following 
the establishment of the new entry and depature regime to the Russian Federation. These opened 
Russia up to the rest of the world and provided Russian citizens with real freedom of movement after 
decades behind the “iron curtain”.  
In order to implement the right of employment abroad given to Russian citizens in 1993, 
licenses started to be issued for assistance in job seeking and for the employment of Russian 
citizens in other countries.  
In the mid-1990s the Russian President signed decrees regulating recruitment and the use of foreign 
workers in the Russian Federation. Procedures for issuing permits to employers for the recruitment of 
a foreign workforce were developed. Bilateral agreements on labour migration were signed with most 
former Soviet countries.  
However, migration regulation was not yet then an active policy. Adopted laws were ad hoc, i.e. 
they were not aimed at forming migration flows for Russian interests. Instead, they reacted to the 
migration situation emerging spontaneously. To a large extent, norms and procedures set by the law 
bore the impress of the Soviet past and administrative mechanisms were used to the detriment of 
economic incentives. This explains, for instance, why foreign workforce recruitment procedures were 
so complicated. They were so bureaucratic and time-consuming that they forced Russian employers to 
hire foreign workers to get around these laws. This results in the growth of illegal migration and the 
unregistered employment of migrants. Harsh measures directed against illegal migration in early 
2000s after the transfer of the Federal Migration Service to the Russian Ministry of Interior did not 
give results.  
Only in the second half of 2000s did Russian migration policy for labour migration become 
proactive. By the mid 2000s it became obvious that migration was out of control and that illegal 
migration was on the rise, despite police raids against illegal migrants. This deformed the labour 
                                                     
10 http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/CrossBorder/print.asp?file=Personal_Remittances_CIS.htm&pid=svs&sid=ITM 
_10234 
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market and led to ethnic tension. The January 2007 migration laws radically changed procedures. At 
least, they did so with work permits and permits for temporary stay/residence and migration 
registration for the citizens of CIS countries, with which Russia had a visa-free regime: Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine11 (i.e. all CIS 
countries, except for Georgia and Turkmenistan).  
In accordance with the new legislation, the recruitment of workers from CIS countries became 
easier both for migrants and for employers. Migrant residence registration was significantly simplified 
(registration via the post office was made possible). The terms for the temporary stay of foreign 
citizens was increased from 90 to 180 days. Migrants could independently obtain a work permit 
without the need for a labour contract from an employer, by submitting the minimum package of 
documents: a passport, migration card, and a tear-off card as evidence of migration registration, and 
the receipt proving that the fee had been paid. Having a work permit, migrants from CIS countries can 
now shop around for employment and they can also change the job within the region where the work 
permit was issued.  
International labour migration statistics immediately recorded the growth in the number of foreign 
citizens from CIS countries officially working in Russia (see fig. 3 in section 5.3.1). There was a 
notable reduction in illegal stay overs and unregistered employment of migrants in the first year. There 
was also, a reduction in “grey” migration business, due to a reduced demand for “grey” services for 
registration and the processing of permission documents. The 2007 foreign workforce quota was set at 
6 million, probably in accordance with the estimates of migrants illegally working in Russia. And it, in 
fact, “opened” the Russian labour market for the citizens of those countries that had been 
acknowledged as the main migration partners of Russia.  
However, in 2008, even before the first signs of the global crisis, it had become evident that the 
new order had significant flaws. First, there were no well thought-out norms ensuring that migrants 
who obtained work permits by themselves would occupy those vacant positions; something which had 
been announced by employers participating in the application campaign. Second, an arbitrary setting 
of a high quota of 6 million for 2007 led employers to relax. As a result most of them did not take part 
in application campaign for 2008, expecting the quota to remain high. As a result, the quota was set at 
1.8 million for 2008, i.e. it was de facto lower than the number of persons legally employed in 2007. 
Thus, already in May 2008 the quota was taken up, and the right to recruit foreign workers became an 
object of sale. The “Grey” migration business quickly recovered its positions. The main losers in this 
situation were Russian employers who, having accepted new rules, intending to rely on the lawful 
employment of foreign workers, were again pushed into illegality.  
In late 2008, the consequences of the global crisis became clear in the labour market and reduced 
the demand for labour, leading to a decline in employment in Russia. The migration policy responded 
to this through tightened rules of labour migrant recruitment. The foreign workforce quota for 2009, 
that had initially been increased to 4 million, was reduced twofold. Furthermore, the main principle set 
forth in the law of 2007, the principle of free employment, was reconsidered. Migrants from “visa-
free” countries again found themselves in strict dependence on employers. Now the work permit is 
initially issued to a migrant for 3 months, in the course of which he or she can find a job, and then – if 
there is a labour contract – it is extended by 9 more months. But, in that case, it must already indicate a 
specific employer and there is no possibility of changing jobs. If a job is not found within three 
months and if there is no labour contract, then the “short” work permit becomes void, and the migrant 
must leave the country. The procedure for checking employers signing labour contracts with foreign 
workers was introduced. Employers are, in fact, checked for participation in the application campaign 
and also for their inclusion in the quota for the corresponding year.  
                                                     
11 Belarus is not included in this list because under the Treaty on the Creation of Union State citizens of both countries have 
equal employment rights in the territory of both states. Belarusian citizens coming to work in Russia do not then need 
work permits.  
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The mechanism is logical, especially in times of crisis, provided it is actually implemented. 
However, complicated procedures without proper transparence strengthened “grey” intermediaries 
and solidified corruption. Violations when hiring foreign workers again became routine in the 
Russian labour market. Even fines established for employers guilty of illegal foreign workforce 
recruitment (up to 800,000 roubles for each employee!) turned out to be a weak barrier on the path 
of illegal migration. After all, the employer can always resolve the problem by paying a small bribe 
to migration controllers.  
2010 was the beginning of a new stage in Russian migration policy. On the one hand, chronic 
problems in illegal migration stimulated the search for new instruments for the legalization of labour 
migrants coming to Russia. “Patents” for employment by physical persons became an instrument of 
this kind. On the other hand, the innovation-based development demanded by Russia raises the 
question of the necessary human resources for this kind of development. Russia needs to be attractive 
to highly-skilled migrants.  
The introduction of new employment rules for these two categories of labour migrants marks a 
new, differentiated approach to managing labour migration flows. Until 2010 international labour 
migration was considered as a practically uniform, unstructured flow. The Russian economy’s need 
for migrants with certain qualifications was confirmed only by the list of professions (occupations, 
positions) of foreign citizens annually adopted by the Russian Ministry of Healthcare and Social 
Development, indicating professions that are not covered by quotas. However, if one takes into 
account that, for instance, in 2009 fewer than 6,000 foreign workers were recruited for the quota-free 
professions, occupations, and positions then the limits of this list in providing the Russian economy 
with highly-qualified foreign specialists should become evident; to put the six thousand in perspective 
it should be remembered that 1.5 million work permits are issued annually. Experts do not know how 
this list is compiled. Meanwhile, according to the estimates of the Russian Ministry of Economic 
Development, “it is necessary to invite around 40,000-60,000 foreign professionals annually for the 
implementation of a modernizing leap in the economy”12.  
Preferences stimulating the inflow of highly-qualified professionals cover both migrants and their 
employers. The preference for highly-qualified professionals consists in the following: (1) a work 
permit is issued once for the term of contract (up to a maximum of three years); (2) in case of work in 
several regions of the Russian Federation a work permit is issued which is valid for all those regions; 
(3) the residence permit is processed for highly-skilled professionals and members of their families for 
the term of their contract; (4) a multiple-entry work visa is issued for the term of the labour contract; 
(5) income tax for highly-qualified professionals working in Russia is 13% from the first day of work 
in Russia; unlike other categories of migrants working in Russia, for whom the income tax rate during 
the first half year in the country is 30% and only 13%, the standard national level, after 183 days. 
Employers recruiting highly-qualified professionals are free from the need to obtain permits and do 
not have to participate in application campaigns. In 2011, 10,000 highly-qualified professionals were 
recruited for work in Russia on these terms.  
This regulation of the recruitment of highly-qualified professionals will, it is hoped, increase 
Russian investment attractiveness. Certainly, it is no secret that an investment decision often directly 
depends on how easy it is to transfer personnel to one country or another (top managers, specialists, 
financial directors etc.).  
“Patents” for migrants coming to Russia to get employed by physical persons were another novelty in 
migration policy and these were introduced in 2010. Migrants planning to work for Russian citizens as 
domestic servants, medical attendants, nannies, cooks, gardeners or on short-term jobs in repair, 
                                                     
12 Statement of the Deputy Minister of Economic Development A.Y. Levitskaya “On the recruitment of highly-qualified 
professionals necessary for modernization of the Russian economy” at the expanded board meeting of the Federal 
Migration Service, 29 January 2010 (FMS 2010: 44).  
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development etc., were legalized. They were legalised not by obtaining a work permit, but by obtaining a 
“patent” for the right to work that cost 1000 roubles a month. The patent term is extended automatically 
after the bank receipt is submitted by post. According to the official data of the Russian Federal 
Migration Service, within one and a half years after this practice had been introduced (December 2011), 
1 million “patents” were sold. However, it remains unclear to what extent this measure, in fact, reduced 
the illegal employment of foreign citizens that stands, it is estimated, at 4-5 million. There is, after all, no 
system for monitoring and controlling workers employed by physical persons, and physical persons do 
not have to notify the authorities about the recruitment of foreign workers. 
The main advantage of the patent system is, perhaps, that it is a simple and easy to understand as a 
mechanism for legal employment. However FMS statistics for 2011 indirectly demonstrates that this 
mechanism is used not only by migrants employed by physical persons. Patents are also employed by 
those who, in fact, work for legal persons: at construction sites, in the open markets etc. In certain 
territories of the Russian Federation the number of patents sold exceeds the quota of work permits set 
for this region, while the quota is not fully taken up. For instance, in the Tomsk Region only 30% of 
the quota was taken, while the number of patents sold exceeded by eight times the number of work 
permits issued. In the Rostov Region the respective figures were 33% and 3 times, in Republic of 
Karelia, 40% and 2.5 times and in the Kurgan Region 50% and 7 times. This problem was especially 
pronounced in the labour-excessive regions of the North Caucasus, where the quota was on average 
56% filled, and the number of issued patents in the Chechen Republic, for instance, exceeded 5 times 
the number of issued work permits. In the Republic of Dagestan the figures were seven times higher, 
in the Karachay–Cherkess Republic, 22 times and in the Republic of Ingooshetia 63 times. 
Table 10 systematizes ways to enter the Russian labour market today for international labour 
migrants. This kind of entry is possible within the annual quota for foreign workers that is reduced 
every year. In fact, it has been turned into an instrument of political manipulation and corruption, even 
outside the quota and even without obtaining work permits. Numerous channels of legal employment 
for foreign citizens are a prerequisite for a flexible migration policy, which meets the interests of 
recipient countries. However, the formation of this system of employment channels ought to rely on 
the evaluation for real demand for a foreign workforce. The toolkit for this evaluation is well-known: 
it is a forward-looking calculation of the labour balance across regions and sectors, including an 
analysis of the sectoral and professional/qualification composition of employed and the unemployed 
population, not to mention an analysis of unfilled vacancies reported to employment services etc.  
Table 10. Existing ways to enter the Russian labour market for international labour migrants 
Within the annual foreign workforce quota 
Outside the annual 
foreign workforce 
quota 
With a work permit 
As a highly qualified professional (Federal law 
FZ-86, 2010)  
Based on the list of quota-free professions 
(occupations, positions), annually adopted by the 
Russian Ministry of Healthcare and Social 
Development 
Without a work permit 
Based on a patent for employment by a physical 
person (Federal law FZ-86, 2010) 
Based on the list adopted by Federal law FZ-115, 
2002*  
Illegal employment 
* Staff of diplomatic missions and consular offices of foreign states in the Russian Federation, staff of international 
organizations, as well as the private household staff of those persons. 
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At present in Russia the need for foreign workers is determined de facto on the basis of a single 
source: the applications of employers for inclusion in the quota for the next year. However, from the 
economic standpoint, these applications do not necessarily correspond to a real workforce deficit. 
First, individual companies and, indeed, whole industries have very uneven capabilities in forecasting 
a recruitment strategy over the long term. Industrial sectors with a high workforce turnover and small 
businesses can have difficulties planning recruitment and layoff programs for the next year. Second, 
even if we take the data for industries and individual companies for granted, employers’ applications 
with regards to recruitment might hide certain entrepreneurial strategies. There may be, for instance, 
the desire to maintain the presence of a certain volume of cheap workforce to increase the 
competitiveness of individual enterprises with large indicators of labour input or even the desire to 
legalize foreign workers illegally present in a given territory (ILO 2009).  
Thus, the most pressing issue in the management of labour migration in Russia is the need to assess 
the real demand for foreign workforce across regions and sectors. This must be done on the basis of 
refined employment statistics, selective surveys of enterprises to identify their provision with human 
resources, and the evaluation of internal migration potential for the population. As a matter of fact, 
these tasks go beyond the scope of policy in the field of international labour migration, which yet 
again confirming that migration policies are derived from general economic policy, employment 
policy, education policy etc.  
In taking active steps to improve the regulation of labour migration flows directed towards Russia, 
the authorities avoid formulating a policy with regards to labour migration from Russia. No legislative 
measures were taken for these migration flows, except for issuing licenses to companies dealing with 
the employment of Russian citizens abroad. In the meantime over 100,000 Russian citizens depart for 
other countries every year in search of jobs. Many of them become illegal migrants, and their rights 
are not observed. Others, on the contrary, succeed; and temporary labour migration may become 
permanent, if they do not feel connected to their motherland. To “not notice” these people means to 
increase the risk of their permanent loss to Russia. The Director of the Russian Federal Migration 
Service K.O. Romodanovsky indicated that in 2011 around 100,000 people left Russia and that 70,000 
were labour migrants. He said that “even if we assume that there are three times more of them [those 
who left] – this is not a loss”.13 Such a position is, in fact, against Russian interests. Not only does it 
fail to respond to the demographic and economic interests of Russia. It also means not even attempting 
to prove to Russian citizens that they are valuable to their own country. 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1. Conclusions from analysis 
The present report has attempted to evaluate the role of international labour migration for Russian 
economic development over the short- and long-term, relying on the very dispersed empirical 
information that has been gathered in: the official statistics bulletins of the Russian Statistical Agency 
(Rosstat); the Federal Migration Service; the Russian Central Bank; in publications of Russian 
researchers; as well as in the published results of various sociological surveys. With regards to labour 
migration into Russia, the analysis gives grounds for the following conclusions.  
(1) The demographic factor has proved formative in the emergence of the labour deficit, and over 
the mid-term the decline of employable-age population and an ageing workforce could easily become 
serious obstacles to economic development. The question then of restructuring the available 
workforce, increasing its qualification potential, reforming the system of professional training and 
retraining in accordance with contemporary production requirements is a matter of the very greatest 
                                                     
13 Interview with Interfax agency, 22 February 2012: http://www.interfax.ru/business/txt.asp?id=232265 
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importance. In this process foreign workers are a crucial resource, compensating, in part, for the 
labour deficit.  
(2) In Russia as a whole the share of foreign workers in the workforce is around 2.5%. However, 
this averaged indicator cloaks considerable variations across regions and economic sectors. In many 
Russian regions, especially in large cities and megacities, foreign workers are now a structural factor 
that cannot efficiently function without recruiting migrants. “Migrant niches” represent a sustainable 
segment of the labour market in a number of sectors, primarily construction, transport, trade and 
services. A significant share of jobs (from 50% in Moscow to 35% in the regions) are already firmly 
“reserved” for migrants.  
Meanwhile, labour migrants primarily fill those niches of the Russian labour market that cannot be 
filled by Russian workers for one reason or another. These are predominantly unskilled jobs that are 
rejected by the locals, as well as some medium- and highly-qualified jobs in groups with high 
qualifications. Here the Russian education system does not train enough human resources of the right 
sort. The structural shortage in the Russian market is in many cases a more important incentive for 
employers to recruit foreign workers than the low cost of migrant labour.  
There are reasons to believe that the need for labour migrants in Russia will increase, at least over 
the short- and mid-term. There are the following factors in favor of this claim: the expected decline of 
the national workforce due to the age composition of the population; the imbalance of supply and 
demand in the national labour market; the segmentation of the Russian labour market; the emergence 
of “ethnic business” in a number of cities; rising demand for those types of work that are currently 
performed primarily by migrants, for instance, increase in demand for services mostly provided by 
female migrants (within the care industry, hospitality and the entertainment industry).  
(3) The most acute problem in terms of a foreign presence in the Russian labour market is the 
unacceptable scale of illegal labour migration and the unregistered employment of foreign workers. 
Over the last fifteen years the illegal recruitment of foreign citizens turned into a sustainable practice 
among numerous Russian employers, providing them with a crucial competitive advantage. Russia 
pays the price for this advantage in the form of labour market deformation, the degradation of labour 
relations, growing corruption, and significant financial losses in the form of unpaid taxes. At the same 
time, weak Russian businesses could, in many cases, not exist without illegal migrants.  
(4) Labour migration from Russia, according to the available statistics, is distinguished by the high 
quality of migrants. Three quarters of Russian citizens departing for employment in other countries 
have higher or secondary education, which is significantly higher than the Russian average. It is also 
significantly higher than the labour migrants coming to work in Russia. In the context of a shrinking 
employable population and the deficit of a skilled workforce in Russia, the departure of Russian 
workers, is a serious blow. This is particularly so because most are highly-skilled with impressive 
qualifications something that reduces Russian labour potential. Brain drain is especially painful for 
Russian economic development, in as much as the outflow of intellectual human resources contributes 
to the growing technological inferiority of Russia.  
(5) Existing model of Russian participation in the world labour market is not rational. It does not 
correspond to the country’s economic development interests. Russia loses skilled personnel due to an 
outflow of its labour potential, while the foreign workforce attracted to the Russian economy mostly 
finds itself in the “grey” sector of the labour market. To some extent the reason for these costs is 
associated with the inefficient migration policies pursued in the course of the last fifteen years. The 
state failed to formulate a clear position with regards to current and future labour migration trends and 
it failed too to develop a corresponding migration strategy. Just to give some sense of this, the draft 
concept on state migration policy has been discussed for ten years (!). The absence of conceptual 
clarity leads to: inconsistencies in adopted measures; internal contradictions in migration legislation; 
and sees the rules changing far too often, confusing Russians and migrants alike..  
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Russian migration policies turn out to be incapable of reducing the scale of illegal migration, 
estimated at 3-5 million people, and incapable too of reducing the “grey” market of migrant labour. 
The “decisive” step taken in 2007 to expand the legal employment channels for migrants from CIS 
countries turned out to be a short-term “experiment”, and in 2009 procedures for foreign workers 
became complicated again. Procedures were not transparent enough, and this strengthened positions of 
“grey” intermediaries and solidified a culture of corruption in this area. 
Quotas for foreign workers are considered the main instrument of national labour market protection 
from foreign competition, but this mechanism is highly debated. The annual quota is set exclusively 
on the basis of employers’ applications without taking into account the real situation in the regional 
labour markets. This cannot then be seen as an objective mechanism for Russia’s economic needs in 
terms of foreign workers. It only symbolizes state control over the labour market.  
The migration reform undertaken in 2010 differentiated the labour migration flows directed to 
Russia on the basis of qualifications and on the basis of forms of employment. This is, no doubt, a step 
towards an improved migration policy and its greater correspondence to the economic interests of the 
country. However, the way the new legislation has been implemented (for instance, in the case of 
“patents” sold to migrants employed by physical persons), leads to doubts. In fact, this innovation 
threatens to introduce even greater uncertainty into the understanding of the real scale of labour 
inflow. And hence its regulation, instead of reducing unregistered employment in this segment of the 
migrant labour market, risks increasing the same.  
Policies with regards to labour migration from Russia that could, for instance, ensure state support 
for returning migrants and thus stimulate the return migration of Russian citizens working abroad, are 
not carried out.  
All this leads to the conclusion that Russian state policies in the field of international labour 
migration needs to be reformed and improved.  
6.2. Recommendations on migration policy improvement 
а) State policy with regards to foreign workforce recruitment 
1. Reliable and objective information on migration and its trends is a fundamental prerequisite 
for efficient migration policy. Current migration statistics in Russia adequately reflects neither 
the scale of migration flows, nor their structure. The unsatisfactory state of international 
migration statistics is a serious problem. It prevents policy-makers from forming an objective 
view of the scale and the structure of migration flows, and thus, from making well-justified 
migration policy decisions. 
2. It is necessary to develop legal employment mechanisms as an alternative to spontaneous, 
illegal migration. These could take in programs of seasonal, short-term and long-term labour 
migration, programs of the organized recruitment of foreign workers in the countries of origin, 
special programs for household employees etc. They ought to be implemented via a well-
developed official migration infrastructure, including the network of state and private 
employment agencies and information and consulting services for migrants.  
3. Foreign workforce quotas ought to rest on the real deficit in the labour market across regions 
and sectors and hence the real need for foreign workers across professional and qualification 
groups and across the Russian regions. For such calculations one needs to refine the 
employment statistics, carry out selective surveys of enterprises to identify their human 
resources, and evaluate internal migration potential. 
4. Transparency and clarity for migrants and for recipient societies ought to be the most 
important principles of policy in the field of international labour migration. Migration ought to 
be accompanied with information and an outreach campaign in Russia and in the countries of 
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origin for migration. The role played by migrants in Russian economic development should be 
explained to the Russian population, whereas the rules of entry, stay, employment and 
behavior in the countries of destination should be explained to potential migrants about to 
arrive. This would hopefully reduce many potential migration risks for both parties.  
5. It is necessary to strengthen the flexibility of migration policy. For that there ought to be in-
built mechanisms that would avoid situations where an objective worsening in the economic 
context demands a radical review of migration legislation.  
6. Migration policy ought to rely on real knowledge about demographic, economic, and 
migration trends and prospects, rather than on existing myths that give rise to the 
“philosophy of anti-migrationism”. This knowledge can be provided by experts dealing in 
migration issues. The governmental request for migration studies and the involvement of the 
expert community in the development of normative documents ought to become a well-
established migration policy practice.  
7. The implementation of the principle of equal pay for equal labour for migrants and national 
workers will turn migrants from the source of cheap workforce into an instrument 
compensating for an objective deficit in the labour market. This approach would overcome the 
problem of salary dumping in industries where migrants are concentrated, as well as the 
problem of migrant exploitation and human trafficking. An important condition here is control 
over employers recruiting foreign workers.  
8. Taking into account the size of Russia and the diversity of local labour markets in the Russian 
regions, it is necessary to provide Russian migration policy with a regional dimension. It 
makes sense from the economic standpoint to grant greater independence to the regions in 
their implementation of the foreign workforce recruitment models which are most appropriate 
for the local labour markets. This measure would help optimize the participation of foreign 
workers in Russian economic development.  
9. The state ought to involve public and private organizations in the implementation of migration 
policies. At the same time, in order for a public-private partnership to be successful, the 
government as the main actor of migration policy ought to clearly articulate: what migration 
policy objectives it intends to pursue; what potential it sees in international labour migration; 
and what functions it is ready to delegate to local authorities, civil society institutions and 
business structures.  
b) State policy with regards to labour migration from Russia 
1. It is important to acknowledge that Russia is not only the recipient of labour migrants, but also 
a donor. Hundreds of thousands of Russian migrants work abroad and the annual outflow of 
labour migrants from Russia is constantly rising. The absence of significant public support for 
those Russians who leave to get a job means that temporary labour migration often turns into 
something more permanent. This is especially true for highly-qualified professionals who, 
having stayed abroad for many years become part of the Russian brain drain.  
2. The state policy of workforce export would make sense in the context of a demographic crisis 
and decline of labour resources. After all, the government could guarantee the employment of 
temporary labour migrants upon their return home, and hence, would prevent the 
transformation of temporary migration into permanent migration. Otherwise, the outflow of 
workers from the country (that would take place anyway) will only aggravate the situation in 
the labour market and will force Russians to search for alternative, not always safe ways to 
leave, in order to work in other countries (Iontsev 2005). 
3. Such policy measures could be: bilateral agreements with recipient countries guaranteeing the 
social and legal rights of Russian labour migrants; improved Russian migration legislation 
regulating external labour migration from Russia; the stimulation of migrants’ money transfers 
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home; increased responsibility of private agencies for overseas employment and their 
involvement in the implementation of bilateral agreements; outreach campaigns informing 
migrants about employment terms and labour legislation in other countries; and the creation of 
conditions for reversible labour migration etc.  
c) The fight against illegal migration 
1. The reduction of illegal migration remains a priority for Russia. It is now understood at the 
national and intergovernmental levels that this task needs more than force to be applied to it. 
There are certain measures that could help reduce illegal migration. These are measures of an 
administrative and legal nature: improvement of migration legislation with its present 
mismatch with labour, tax and social legislation; efficient immigration control; raising 
awareness among migrants of legal employment opportunities; simple and transparent 
procedures for migrant registration, obtaining residence and work permits; extending the terms 
of work permits and bringing these in line with the term of permitted stay in the country and 
labour contract terms; multiple programs to attract temporary labour migrants for different 
categories of workers and different economic industries; clear mechanisms of recruitment for 
foreign workers and efficient control over these rules etc. 
2. The most efficient measures in fighting illegal migration and illegal employment are measures 
of an economic nature: establishing order in the labour market, pushing “grey” practices out of 
labour relations, enhancing employers’ liability for the illegal recruitment of foreign workers, 
including criminal liability for identified cases of slavery and human trafficking. On the other 
hand, clear and transparent channels of legal employment for foreign citizens are needed. 
These would compensate for the deficit in the Russian labour market with legally employed 
migrants having equal rights with local workers. 
3. Intergovernmental cooperation ought to be a crucial component in the fight against illegal 
migration. This would range from cooperation in strengthening border controls, to information 
exchange, to the harmonization of national legislation regulating the liability of persons 
assisting illegal migrants to cooperation in professional training of personnel in demand as 
legal labour migrants.  
d) Strengthening regional intergovernmental cooperation in migration 
1. Over the two post-Soviet decades sustainable migration ties have formed between the majority 
of CIS countries. Most migration flows represent labour migration, a crucial condition of 
economic development for Russia; Russia is the main center of gravity for labour migrants in 
the region, and for Central Asian states, Transcaucasia, Ukraine, and Moldova, acting as 
countries “delegating” migrants. Labour migration for both groups of countries became firmly 
built into their national economies, providing recipient countries with the necessary workforce 
and simultaneously offering an employment opportunity to citizens from other countries. 
Risks of regional imbalances are reduced through the mechanism migration interaction and, 
thus, sustainable development and growth of the economic potential of the region as a whole is 
ensured. This situation creates very special conditions for the development of 
intergovernmental regional cooperation in migration.  
2. Nevertheless, the potential for intergovernmental cooperation in migration 
management remains to a large extent unfulfilled. Most agreements signed within the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, the Eurasian Economic Community or on a 
bilateral basis are mere declarations not implemented in practice. Only in recent years 
have real steps towards a common economic space been outlined, including the 
cancellation of restrictions for workforce movement. On 1 January, 2012 the following 
agreements between member states of the Customs Union – Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
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Russia – entered into force. There was agreement on the legal status of working 
migrants and members of their families and agreement too on countering illegal labour 
migration from third countries. There was also an expansion of this alliance by 
including the countries of migrants’ origin. This meant primarily Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, which have already demonstrated their interest towards joining a common 
economic space, and all these countries will form a single regional market in a 
significant part of the post-Soviet space.  
3. It makes sense to initiate the regional consultation process in the post-Soviet space as an 
unofficial forum of interested countries that would meet on a regular basis and which would 
include the representatives of governments, civil-society institutions and experts. This process 
would achieve consensus in the understanding of migration processes linking post-Soviet 
states, rendering assistance to governments to improve the mechanisms of migration 
management and developing migration cooperation, as well as exchanging information, ideas 
and positive experiences in international migration. Common interests and problems ought to 
be identified in such areas as: the contribution of migration to the economic development of 
participating countries; the formation of the common labour market; the protection of 
migrants’ rights; the establishment of a migration infrastructure; and the fight against the 
illegal transfer of migrants and human trafficking.  
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